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Adopting a regulatory focus perspective, I study why people repeat a prior behavior that 
could be unpleasant, ineffective, or unethical.  Driven by the concerns to avoid negative 
deviations from the status quo, the prevention aspect of self-regulation (i.e., prevention focus) is 
associated with the motivation to maintain the status quo (Higgins, 2005).  Previous findings 
showing a prevention focus motivation to maintain the status quo suggest that sticking with a 
precedent is a safe choice that fits with prevention focus.  Putting this motivation to a more 
challenging test, nine studies show that maintaining the status quo is a deep motivation for 
prevention focus that transcends hedonic, utilitarian, and ethical concerns.  Specifically, being in 
a prevention focus, either measured as a chronic disposition or induced as a psychological state, 
increases the likelihood of 1) copying the managing behaviors of a role model, even when these 
behaviors are perceived as unpleasant or ineffective (Studies 1-5), and 2) repeating one’s own 
choices regarding ethical behavior, regardless of whether the initial choice was ethical or not 
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Repeating the follies of the past is never a remote phenomenon in our daily life.  Not only 
do we witness others stumbling onto the same fault on a frequent basis, but few of us could deny 
immunity from such experiences ourselves.  Repeating behaviors is not restricted to reproducing 
our own past behaviors; it is often manifested in our willingness to copy, or imitate, the 
behaviors of others, such as a parent, graduate advisor, or work supervisor, when we take on the 
same roles.  Although some repetitions are beneficial from a learning perspective, others may 
lead to detrimental consequences.  For example, copying an ineffective behavior of a bad boss 
can perpetuate a vicious cycle of strained work relations; repeating a small ethical misstep can 
lead individuals and organizations down a slippery slope of ethical degradation. 
At first blush, repeating a behavior that produces unpleasantness, ineffectiveness, or 
unethicality appears to result from bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), which attributes 
suboptimal decisions to resource constraints, such as limited information, time, or cognitive 
capacity.  However, bounded rationality would still predict a motivation to strive for rationality 
by maximizing utility functions under these constraints, which would produce different 
behaviors than simply keeping an existing course of action.  Therefore, the rational elements in 
choices are unlikely to explain why people would repeat a problematic behavior.  In fact, given 
the essential role of non-rational factors in decision-making such as goals and motives (Kunda, 
1990; Simon, 1993), understanding when and why repetition occurs requires a motivational 
analysis.  This raises the question that drives the present research: what motivational concern 
increases people’s tendency to repeat past behaviors, especially when these behaviors are 
unpleasant, ineffective, or unethical? 
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Drawing on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), I attempt to unpack the self-
regulatory mechanism underlying repetition of a prior behavior.  Specifically, I propose that the 
prevention aspect of self-regulation (i.e., prevention focus) motivates such repetition.  
Committed by either others or oneself, a prior behavior can establish the status quo (i.e., a 
precedent) by setting the benchmark for one’s behavior in similar situations, and repeating a 
prior behavior can reflect a motivation to maintain the status quo.  Thus, the general purpose of 
my research is to investigate the relation between prevention focus and the motivation to repeat 
behaviors, as well as to evaluate the relative predominance of this motivation over other 
concerns such as hedonic, utilitarian, or ethical concerns. 
I begin by identifying two forms of repetition.  One form focuses on repetition of a prior 
behavior by another person, even when that behavior is perceived as unpleasant or ineffective.  
Specifically, I am interested in one’s choice to copy the managing behaviors of a role model 
(e.g., school grader, work supervisor) after one experiences these behaviors as their recipient and 
later takes on the same managing role.  The second form of repetition focuses on repeating one’s 
own prior behavior that involves ethical issues.  Specifically, I study one’s ethical choices when 
one is provided with two consecutive opportunities to behave unethically.  I focus on these two 
forms of repetition not because they are the only ways to maintain the status quo, but because 
they are typical and illustrative examples of the phenomenon of interest.   
Further, I draw on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) to analyze the self-regulatory 
processes behind repetition of a prior behavior, and hypothesize that the prevention aspect of 
self-regulation (i.e., prevention focus) motivates both forms of repetition, regardless of whether 
the prior behavior is unpleasant, ineffective, or unethical.  These predictions are tested in both 
experimental and field studies, where prevention focus is either measured as a chronic 
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disposition or induced as a psychological state.  Finally, I discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings, address the limitations of the current studies, and propose future 
directions of this research. 
Repeating Others: Copying the Managing Behaviors of a Role Model 
Driven by their social nature, people often exhibit behaviors that are strongly influenced 
by those of others.  An example of such influence is copying or imitating the behaviors of others, 
especially when people later hold the same role as those others in a similar relationship: they 
behave like their same-sex parent when they become a parent, like their graduate advisor when 
they become a student advisor, or like their former work superior when they take on a similar 
role as manager.  Indeed, people often copy a managing behavior from their former superior—
parent, graduate advisor, or business manager—even if their earlier experience with this behavior 
was negative.  In these cases, people are copying a managing behavior from someone else, called 
a role model, after directly experiencing this behavior earlier as its recipient.  To date, most 
research on copying has focused on the importance of outcome expectations, whereby imitation 
is expected to be followed by positive outcomes (Bandura, 1977; Manz & Sims, 1981; Weiss, 
1977, 1978).  What has received less attention is the possibility that other motivational 
mechanisms may underlie copying.  Is there a kind of motivational concern which would 
increase the tendency to copy independent of the outcomes that were experienced as a recipient 
of the role model’s managing behavior? 
I define copying as repetition of a role model’s managing behavior after one directly 
experiences this behavior as its recipient and later takes on the same managing role in a similar 
relationship (e.g., grader-student, superior-subordinate).  Compared with vicarious learning, 
which views behavioral change as an individual action through observation or imagination of a 
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role model’s behavior and related outcomes (Baer, Peterson, & Sherman, 1967; Bandura, 1977; 
Sims & Manz, 1982), copying occurs in an interpersonal context where recipients of a role 
model’s managing behavior acquire this behavior through direct experience, which may have 
produced dissatisfaction with this behavior.  For example, students dislike a harsh grader, but 
some of them may choose the harsh grading when they later become graders, expecting dislike 
from their own students.  Rather than only addressing the instrumental concerns about reward 
and punishment associated with a managing behavior, copying can involve a deeper motivation 
that transcends hedonic experience. 
By definition, copying resembles perpetuation of role-related behaviors across similar 
relationships.  Characterized by distinct patterns of behaviors, roles convey normative 
expectations for the behaviors of those who occupy these roles (see Biddle, 1986, for a review).  
For those who are new to an interpersonal role, a role model’s behaviors are often understood 
and interpreted as normative, and copying a role model’s behaviors thus indicates conformity to 
an interpersonal norm.  Furthermore, normativeness lies in the characteristic behaviors 
associated with an interpersonal role, instead of the specific individual who occupies the role.  
Therefore, copying role-related behaviors facilitates the transmission of interpersonal norms 
across relationships.  
Much of the evidence on norm transmission has been found in group settings where a 
norm constructed in a group is perpetuated by successive generations of new members (e.g., 
Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Weick & Gilfillan, 1971; Whiten, Horner, & 
de Waal, 2005).  The transmission of group norms through generations of members suggests the 
possibility that individuals will copy interpersonal norms across similar relationships, especially 
when they see themselves as representative of a social position and are willing to fulfill their 
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roles in a norm-consistent way (Bates & Harvey, 1975; Burt, 1976; Winship & Mandel, 1983).  
However, not everyone acts out their interpersonal roles.  Some prefer personal attitudes and 
beliefs to guide their actions (Janis & Mann, 1977; Turner, 1976).  For example, a third of the 
participants in the Milgram study did not obey the experimenter’s orders all the way (Milgram, 
1963).  Neither did a quarter of the participants in the Asch experiment succumb to the group 
pressure (Asch, 1956).  Therefore, even under strong normative influence, individuals vary in 
their tendency to behave in a norm-consistent way.  For this reason, the tendency to copy a role 
model’s managing behavior may vary across individuals, depending on their motivation to fulfill 
the norms associated with an interpersonal role.  However, it is unclear from the literature what 
factors may drive such individual differences and what underlying mechanisms can explain these 
differences.  Adopting a self-regulatory perspective, I argue that the ways in which people self-
regulate their behaviors during goal pursuit play an important role in their responses to norms 
and consequently their choice to copy the managing behaviors of a role model. 
Repeating Oneself: Persisting in One’s Own Unethical Behavior  
 Unlike copying that depicts repetition of the interpersonal behavior associated with a 
social role, persistence is defined here as an independent behavioral tendency to repeat a past 
behavior of oneself.  People exhibit persistence when they continue to pursue a course of action 
initiated by themselves, even despite the problems with this course of action (Feather, 1962).  
According to this definition, persistence reflects maintaining the status quo created by oneself.  
Research on persistence dates back to the early stage of developments in social psychology 
(Lewin, 1935; McDougall, 1908; Tolman, 1932), and the concept of persistence has been studied 
in various forms such as goal pursuit (e.g., Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998; Wicklund & 
Gollwitzer, 1982), attitude change (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), and resource 
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depletion (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Webb & Sheeran, 
2003).  Because another goal of this section of the paper is to address the question of whether 
maintaining the status quo transcends ethical concerns, here I focus on persistence in self-made 
ethical choices. 
Ethical decision-making has long been viewed as a logical and rational process. 
However, recent evidence shows that nonrational factors often play a critical role in ethical 
thoughts and behaviors, such as heuristics (Kahneman, 2003), intuition (Haidt, 2001), 
relationships (Cottone, 2001), and contexts (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; see Rogerson, Gottlieb, 
Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011, for a review). These nonrational influences render 
ethical decision-making a motivated reasoning process (Kunda, 1990), where goals and motives 
guide people’s judgment about what is ethical and subject their behavior to motivational biases. 
Faced with the decision to behave unethically, people often struggle between the desire for short-
term benefits and the desire for positive moral self-regard (Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, 
& Ariely, 2009; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).  When 
the former desire dominates the latter, their decision leans toward behaving unethically at the 
cost of a compromised moral self-image, which will set off various cognitive forms of motivated 
reasoning to restore the moral self-regard, such as moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999; 
Trevino, Detert, Sweitzer, & Gephart, 2008), distortion (Bersoff, 1999), neutralization (Minor, 
1984; Robinson & Kraatz, 1998), and justification (Giacalone & Knouse, 1990; Schweitzer & 
Hsee, 2002; Tenbrunsel, 1995).  It has been shown that these motivated cognitions serve as the 
means for rationalizing a previous misconduct.   
What receives less attention is whether rationalization of a prior misconduct can manifest 
itself in a subsequent choice to be ethical or not, but there are some relevant findings.  One such 
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finding is that one little step across the line can lead to more frequent and severe transgressions 
along a slippery slope (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).  A slippery 
slope originates from an innocuous lapse that is ambiguous in its appropriateness, such as a fault 
of negligible magnitude.  Such a lapse provides tempting financial benefits yet poses little threat 
to people’s moral self-regard (Mazar et al., 2008), falling within an “elastic” range that can be 
easily rationalized as ethical (Hsee, 1995; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002).  Although the lapse may 
not impose consequential harm in itself, it lays the ground for more significant misconducts.  In 
fact, the notion that a relatively minor lapse can trigger ethical degradation accords well with the 
human inclination to use past behaviors as a benchmark for evaluating new behaviors, such that 
if past behaviors are acceptable, similar or just slightly different behaviors will also be 
considered as acceptable (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). 
In addition to the possibility that an initial lapse authorizes similar unethical behaviors, 
the motivated reasoning account predicts that people will feel obligated to retrospectively justify 
their previous lapse through rationalizing strategies such as repetition (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
This is because aligning new behaviors with a past behavior enables people to claim the 
legitimacy of the past behavior.  This mechanism resembles a “hardening” model of moral 
erosion (Hirschi, 1969; Minor, 1984), by which episodic delinquent acts occur as a result of the 
rationalizing beliefs to protect oneself from admitting the unethical foundations of an earlier act. 
With this kind of reasoning, retrospective rationalization of a previous misconduct bears 
similarity to the root cause of escalation of commitment, a well-studied phenomenon that 
portrays a counterintuitive persistence in a failing course of action chosen by oneself (Brockner, 
1992; Schoorman, 1988; Staw, 1976).  Mostly studied as a fallacy in economic decision-making, 
escalation of commitment has shed new light on business ethics.  For example, Ashforth and 
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Anand (2003) proposed escalation of commitment as a primary path to organizational 
corruptions, where small, relatively harmless acts that are each meant to solve a pressing issue 
end up producing cognitive dissonance that invokes rationalizing strategies.  Moore, Tetlock, 
Tanlu, and Bazerman (2006) also discussed how escalation of commitment facilitates moral 
seduction by leading auditors to gradually compromise their independence in covering up prior 
violations.  It is clear from these examples that retrospective rationalization not only explains the 
choice to keep allocating economic resources in a failing activity (Brockner, 1992; Staw & Ross, 
1989), but it also identifies one possible mechanism underlying the tendency to slide down a 
slippery slope (Tenbrunsel, 1995; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). 
As an innocuous departure from ethical principles, the initial lapse may be an inadvertent 
act that is not construed as an unethical commission.  Under such circumstance, will it still have 
binding effects on a subsequent ethical choice?  It is possible that the motivation to rationalize a 
past lapse, whether it is intentional or not, will remain a driving force of additional unethical 
behaviors.  This is because one’s initial decision to allow occurrence of the lapse signifies a 
personal choice, which forms an immediate link between the lapse and one’s moral self-
evaluation and holds one responsible for the initial decision.  The responsibility then creates a 
psychological commitment to the decision, as withdrawal or reversal from this decision 
constitutes an admission that it is a questionable act (Staw, 1976; 1981).  Supporting this 
argument, the slippery slope of ethical degradation often contains a tipping point where an 
unconscious misconduct escalates into a deliberate transgression: by the time people realize the 
unethicality of their initial behavior, they are already partly down the slippery slope—a “strong 
situation” that is very difficult to extricate themselves from (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Darley, 
1992; Moore et al., 2006). 
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With the implicit assumption that unethical behaviors are the product of strong situations 
that override individual differences (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), most earlier research on ethics 
and moral psychology kept individual differences in motivation that could consistently predict 
unethical behaviors out of its analysis (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Street & Street, 2006).  More 
recently, however, the field has witnessed an increasing interest in self-regulatory mechanisms 
underlying unethical behaviors, such as moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & 
Freeman, 2008), self-regulatory resources (Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011), and chronic 
dispositions of moral self-regulation (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010; Moore, Detert, 
Treveno, Baker, & Mayer, 2012).  Still, the role of self-regulation in repeated unethical 
behaviors remains an open question: does people’s propensity to repeat their past misconduct 
depend on how they regulate their behaviors during goal pursuit?  In addressing this question, I 
apply regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to identify the key motivational processes 
underlying the choice to repeat versus reverse the ethical stance of one’s past misconduct. 
A Regulatory Focus View of Maintaining the Status Quo 
Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two self-regulatory orientations: the 
promotion focus and the prevention focus, which are oriented, respectively, towards approaching 
matches to desired outcomes and avoiding mismatches to desired outcomes (Higgins, 1997, 
1998).  Concerned with gain/nongain information, promotion focus is sensitive to positive 
deviations from the status quo (the difference between “0” and “+1”), and this sensitivity results 
in the eagerness to ensure hits and avoid failures in advancement (errors of omission).  Thus, 
when at the status quo, promotion-focused individuals generally have a strategic preference for 
risky tactics (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001).  In contrast, prevention focus 
is the aspect of self-regulation concerned with nonloss/loss information, and it is marked by a 
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sensitivity to negative deviations from the status quo (the difference between “0” and “-1”).  
Such sensitivity generates the vigilance to ensure correct rejections and guard against 
unnecessary and costly actions (errors of commission).  Hence, when at the status quo, 
prevention-focused individuals generally have a strategic preference for conservative tactics 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman & Förster, 2001). 
The regulatory focus differences in self-regulatory concerns and strategic preferences 
reflect an essential distinction between promotion and prevention foci with regard to the status 
quo.  Geared towards positive deviations from the status quo, promotion focus motivates 
individuals to seek out new states with potential growth instead of staying at the status quo.  In 
contrast, guarded against negative deviations from the status quo, prevention focus motivates 
individuals to maintain the status quo instead of trying out new alternatives.  Indeed, previous 
research shows that individuals with a prevention focus prefer stability in carrying out an 
activity, such that they choose to resume an interrupted task or keep currently possessed objects 
instead of switching to alternatives, regardless of whether the original task or object was chosen 
by themselves or assigned by others (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). 
Prevention Focus and Copying the Managing Behaviors of a Role Model 
I argue that copying represents a behavioral tactic that fits with the prevention concerns 
about avoiding negative deviations from the status quo.  As discussed early, a role model’s 
managing behaviors indicate the normative ways of managing the other person, and copying 
these behaviors serves as a conservative strategy that ensures against behaviors that deviate from 
the norms.  Note that the term “norms” used here refers to what a role model actually does 
instead of what he/she should do to manage the other person.  This is because as direct recipients 
of a role model’s managing behaviors, people will perceive these behaviors as a descriptive norm 
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rather than an injunctive norm (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).  Providing information about 
what are typical or normal behaviors associated with a managing role, a descriptive norm 
constitutes the status quo for the behavior of those occupying the managing role.  Given the 
association between prevention focus and the tendency to maintain the status quo, it is likely that 
being in a prevention focus motivates copy the managing behaviors of a role model. 
In support of this proposal, there is burgeoning evidence that regulatory focus (Higgins, 
1997) offers a useful approach to understanding individual differences in responsiveness to 
normative influence (Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004).  Research shows 
that individuals in a strong prevention focus react strongly to violation of reciprocity norms 
(Keller, Hurst, & Uskul, 2008).  There is also evidence that thinking about death, which triggers 
a prevention-focused mindset, increases people’s adherence to social norms (Gailliot, Stillman, 
Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008).  Moreover, as a prevention concern stemming from the fear 
of exploitation and mistreatment in relationships (Lynch, Eisenberger, & Armeli, 1999), 
wariness predicts a sensitivity to the normative level of supportive behaviors, such that wary 
individuals adjust the amount of support they provide to others based on how much support they 
have received from others. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that individuals in a prevention focus tend to copy a role 
model’s managing behavior after experiencing this behavior as its recipient and later taking on 
the same managing role.  Further, according to regulatory fit theory (Higgins, 2005), when 
people experience fit with the means to carrying out an activity, they derive value from this 
means and feel right about it, independent of the effectiveness or hedonic quality of this means.  
This suggests that for individuals in a prevention focus, copying a role model’s normative 
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managing behavior provides a fit experience that transcends other concerns, such as whether the 
managing behavior is pleasant or effective. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Prevention focus predicts the tendency to copy the normative managing 
behaviors of a role model, independent of one’s hedonic experience or effectiveness 
concerns with these behaviors. 
Prevention Focus and Persisting in the Unethical Behavior of Oneself 
Setting a low benchmark for what are considered acceptable behaviors (Gino & 
Bazerman, 2009), a previous misconduct constitutes an unethical status quo that sanctions further 
transgressions.  Given that individuals with a prevention focus are ultimately driven to maintain 
the status quo independent of other concerns, they are expected to follow the precedent by 
committing additional misconduct.  For these individuals, carrying out a similar act to what they 
have done fulfills a felt necessity to protect their moral self-image, which would otherwise be 
tainted by the admission that their previous behavior is problematic.  Moreover, when the 
previous misconduct is too innocuous to thwart their moral self-regard, repeating a previous 
misconduct represents a rationalizing strategy to preserve an intact moral self-regard.  This 
argument is congruent with Moore et al.’s (2006) analysis of auditors’ endorsement of their 
clients’ accounting that clearly violates GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), an 
unethical practice resulting from the motivation to avoid admitting their early failure to demand 
the clients to change accounting methods that skirted the edge of GAAP. 
Previous research reveals a positive relation between prevention focus and persistence in 
an existing course of activity (Liberman et al., 1999), such that individuals in a prevention focus 
prefer resuming an interrupted task over starting a substitute task, and that they are more 
reluctant to exchange previously owned objects with new ones.  However, these findings are 
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based on the assumption that the originally course of action is satisfactory and therefore 
represents a safe choice, which does not necessarily explain why people are committed to 
unethical behaviors.  My research aims to extend these findings by putting the prevention effects 
to a more challenging test, where persistence requires one to forgo morally better alternatives. 
Repeating an unethical behavior may seem contrastive with the prevention focus on 
avoiding negative states, as most unethical behaviors are accompanied by negative feelings such 
as shame and guilt (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).  It also 
appears to clash with the prevention preference for conservative tactics, in that repeat offenders 
are often subject to higher levels of penalty than first-time offenders (Braithwaite, 1984; 
Simpson, 2002).  However, when people with a prevention focus are faced with an irrevocable 
unethical choice they made early, what constitutes a greater concern for them is to rationalize 
this choice through justifying strategies such as repetition, even if doing so may expose them to 
the risk of deeper entrapments.  Consistent with this argument, research finds that prevention 
focus motivates risk-seeking behaviors when the risky option offers the sole possibility to return 
to the status quo (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010).  These arguments thus lead 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Prevention focus predicts the tendency to engage in additional unethical 
behavior following an unethical action than an ethical action. 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The first set of studies (Studies 1-5) tested the role of prevention focus in copying the 
managing behaviors of a role model (Hypothesis 1).  The experimental studies adopted a testing-
grading paradigm (Studies 1-4), where participants took a test, received one of two grading 
methods (harsh vs. lenient), and chose between two grading methods (harsh vs. lenient) to grade 
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the similar tests of others.  Regulatory focus was both measured as a chronic disposition toward 
prevention- or promotion-focused goals (Studies 1, 3, 4; Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, 
Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001) and induced as a psychological state (Study 2; Friedman & Förster, 
2001; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse, & Williams, 2007).  I 
also examined the normative determination of copying (Study 3), and tested the independence of 
copying from hedonic experience (Studies 1-4) and effectiveness concerns (Study 4).  Then, 
using an organizational sample of superior-subordinate dyads (Study 5), I examined 
generalizability of the prevention-copying relation from the experimental setting to the field. 
The second set of studies (Studies 6-9) employed experimental design to explore the 
relation between prevention focus and persistence in one’s own unethical behavior (Hypothesis 
2).  Two types of unethical behaviors were evaluated: 1) overstatement of performance for 
potential monetary gain in an independent decision-making context (Studies 6-8), and 2) failure 
to disclose information to a negotiation opponent in a social-interactive context (Study 9).  In 
each study, participants were tempted to make two consecutive unethical decisions.  Reflecting a 
slippery slope pattern, the first decision involved a relatively minor breach of ethical principles 
and the second decision involved a more significant violation.  I evaluated whether participants 
decided to behave unethically repeatedly.  As the first set of the studies on copying, I also 
assessed whether their repeated unethical decisions were affected by prevention focus, which 
was either measured as a chronic disposition (Studies 6 & 7) or situationally induced as a 





Participants and design.  Fifty-one college students from a Northeastern university 
participated in the experiment, receiving $5 in return.  They were randomly assigned to two 
method conditions: half of them received a harsh grading method in the testing task and the other 
half received a lenient grading method.  The data of two participants who failed to follow the 
instructions properly were discarded. 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  Participants were recruited for a study allegedly on 
“learning on standard tests”.  Upon arrival, they were seated in adjacent cubicles containing a 
table, a chair, and a computer in front of them.  Participants performed the tasks on computer, 
which was programmed to provide instructions for two consecutive tasks.  They first completed 
the regulatory focus questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001), which measured their prevention and 
promotion foci as two separate dimensions.  An example item of the prevention focus scale is 
“Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times [reversed score] (1 = never or 
seldom, 5 = very often).” An example item of the promotion focus scale is “Do you often do well 
at different things that you try (1 = never, 5 = always)?” 
The first task was a 10-minute standard test, which included a set of GMAT-style 
multiple choice questions presented in two sections, with three questions in each section.  The 
total score was five points for a section and ten points for the whole test.  Once participants 
completed and submitted the test, they read their score for each section and for the whole test, 
which was calculated by either a harsh or a lenient grading method.  Participants in the harsh 
condition must answer all three questions correctly to get five points for a section.  Otherwise, 
they would get no point even though they answered one or two questions correctly.  In contrast, 
participants in the lenient condition would get five points for a section if they answered at least 
one question correctly and no point only if they missed all three questions. 
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Participants also read information about the received grading method, as well as an 
alternative method used to grade the tests of some other participants in the same experiment.  In 
addition, a rationale was given for why they received a certain method.  Specifically, participants 
in the harsh condition read, 
Compared with the alternative method (i.e., lenient grading method), the method you 
received has shown to be more effective in improving one’s learning on standard tests.  
Because this test emphasizes precision and thoroughness of thinking, which allows no 
mistakes, it is pretty consistent with the high standard reflected in this method. 
Participants in the lenient condition read, 
Compared with the alternative method (i.e., harsh grading method), the method you 
received has shown to be more effective in improving one’s learning on standard tests.  
Because this test emphasizes precision and thoroughness of thinking, which makes it 
difficult to get everything correct, students should be fully rewarded for their partial 
success by this method. 
After reading this information, participants responded to four items assessing their 
satisfaction with the received method (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  A sample item 
was “All in all, I am satisfied with the calculation.” Participants also responded to four items 
measuring their perceived strictness of the method (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  A 
sample item was “The calculation is more strict than I would normally expect.”  Both scales had 
adequate reliabilities (satisfaction: Cronbach’s α = .92; strictness: Cronbach’s α = .74)1 and their 
average scores were used in the analysis. 
Then participants were asked whether they would grade a set of paper tests similar to the 
test they just took.  They were told that the paper tests were taken by college students preparing 
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for a GMAT exam.  The grading took two minutes, and their task was to help researchers find 
the better way to improve students’ learning on standard tests.  In doing so, they needed to 
choose a grading method and use it to grade the tests. 
Upon their agreement to help, participants were presented with the two methods (harsh 
and lenient) that they read about in the testing task.  After making their choice, participants 
started grading the tests using the chosen method.  When finished, participants completed 
demographics questions.  Then they were paid, thanked, and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check.  Participants in the harsh condition rated the received method as 
more strict (M = 3.51, SD = 0.93) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 3.02, SD = 
0.69), t(47) = 2.10, p < .05.  In addition, participants in the harsh condition received lower test 
scores (M = 1.60, SD = 2.78) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 6.88, SD = 3.23), 
t(47) = -6.13, p < .001.  Therefore, the manipulation of method conditions was successful.  
Further, participants in the harsh condition expressed less satisfaction with the received method 
(M = 2.52, SD = 0.92) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.08), t(47) = -
1.86, p = .07. 
Copying.  To test Hypothesis 1 that prevention focus predicts copying, I conducted a 
logistic regression analysis, using the method chosen for grading as the dependent variable.  This 
yielded a main effect of the received method, β = 1.86, z = 2.70, p < .01, suggesting a general 
tendency of copying, that is, participants would choose the received method for later grading.  
Neither promotion nor prevention focus had a main effect, ps > .20.  However, the hypothesized 
interaction between prevention focus and the received method emerged, β = 3.08, z = 2.18, p < 
.05.  As Figure 1 shows, as the level of chronic prevention focus increases, the tendency to 
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choose the received method also increases, regardless of which method participants received 
earlier.  Further, simple slope tests2 performed at one standard deviation above and below the 
mean of prevention focus indicated a tendency to choose the received method among participants 
with a strong prevention focus, t(40) = 2.77, p < .01, but not among participants with a weak 
prevention focus, t(40) = -0.62, ns, suggesting that copying only occurred among individuals in a 
strong prevention focus.  These results thus lend support to the hypothesized relation between 
prevention focus and copying.  
In contrast, there was no significant interaction effect between promotion focus and the 
received method, β = -1.68, z = -1.69, p = .09, supporting the notion that promotion focus was 
not associated with copying.  Indeed, if anything, the direction of the promotion effect was 
opposite to the prevention effects.  Taken together, the main effect of the received method on 
copying was driven by the copying tendency of individuals in a strong prevention focus.  Hence, 
Study 1 supports Hypothesis 1 that having a strong prevention focus, but not a strong promotions 
focus, predicts the tendency to copy a role model’s managing behavior after directly 
experiencing this behaviors as its recipient. 
To test whether the relation between prevention focus and copying held independent of 
one’s hedonic experience, I controlled participants’ satisfaction with the received method in the 
regression analysis, as well as its interaction with the received method.  With the two control 
variables entered in the analysis, the interaction between prevention focus and the received 
method remained significant, β = 3.02, z = 2.12, p < .05, supporting the regulatory fit argument 
that copying results from the fit between prevention focus and a role model’s managing behavior 
independent of one’s hedonic experience. 
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Study 1 provided the first evidence for Hypothesis 1 about the relation between 
prevention focus and a tendency to copy a role model’s managing behavior.  Not only did 
individuals in a strong prevention focus choose the received method for later grading, but they 
did so regardless of how they felt about the method earlier as its recipients.  Because regulatory 
focus was measured as a chronic disposition here, Study 2 aimed to replicate these results by 
situationally inducing a temporary promotion or prevention focus.  Moreover, the experimental 
manipulation of regulatory focus in Study 2 would allow the assessment of the causal relation 
between regulatory focus and copying. 
Study 2 
Methods 
Participants and design.  One hundred and three college students from a Northeastern 
university participated in the experiment, receiving $5 in return.  The design was a 2 (regulatory 
focus: prevention vs. promotion) × 2 (method received: harsh vs. lenient) between-subjects 
factorial.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.  The data of five 
participants who failed to follow the instructions were discarded. 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  The experimental tasks and procedures were the 
same as Study 1, except that regulatory focus was situationally induced as a temporary state 
rather than measured as a chronic disposition.  Half of the participants were assigned to the 
prevention focus condition and the other half to the promotion focus condition.  Manipulation of 
regulatory focus was achieved through two tasks.  The first task used an in-context goal priming 
paradigm (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005), which was introduced before 
the testing task. Participants in the prevention focus condition read, 
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Please take a couple of minutes to briefly describe the behaviors and outcomes you seek 
to avoid during this test.  Think about how you could prevent these behaviors and 
outcomes and write it down in the box below. 
Participants in the promotion focus condition read, 
Please take a couple of minutes to briefly describe the behaviors and outcomes you seek 
to achieve during this test.  Think about how you could promote these behaviors and 
outcomes and write it down in the box below. 
Then participants started the standard test.  After submitting the test but before seeing 
their score, participants completed the second manipulation task while waiting for their tests 
being graded.  This manipulation used a general goal priming task, where participants listed their 
current promotion or prevention goals in life (Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Idson et al., 2000).  
Participants in the promotion condition were told: “Please think about something you ideally 
would like to do.  In other words, think about a hope or aspiration that you currently have.  
Please list the hope or aspiration below.”  Participants in the prevention condition were told: 
“Please think about something you think you ought to do.  In other words, think about a duty or 
obligation that you currently have.  Please list the duty or obligation below.”  When finished, 
participants received their score calculated by either a harsh or a lenient method, read 
information about the grading methods, and proceeded to the rest of the study as in Study 1.  At 
the end of the study, participants responded to an 8-point question: “In the computer test you 
took at the beginning, did you focus more on avoiding negative behaviors and outcomes (1) or 
did you focus more on approaching positive behaviors and outcomes (8)?”  
Results and Discussion  
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Manipulation check.  Responses to the last question showed that participants in the 
prevention focus condition focused more on avoiding negative behaviors and outcomes and less 
on approaching positive behaviors and outcomes in the testing task (M = 4.69, SD = 2.37) than 
participants in the promotion focus condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.14), t(96) = 2.33, p < .05, 
suggesting that the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful.  Manipulation of the method 
conditions was also successful, in that participants in the harsh condition rated the received 
method as more strict (M = 3.91, SD = 0.71) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.70, 
SD = 0.89), t(96) = 7.44, p < .001.  In addition, participants in the harsh condition received lower 
test scores (M = 2.04, SD = 2.87) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 8.37, SD = 2.58), 
t(96) = -11.47, p < .001.  
Moreover, participants in the harsh condition expressed less satisfaction with the received 
method (M = 2.45, SD = 0.92) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.99, SD = 0.84), 
t(96) = -3.05, p < .01.  However, participants in the promotion condition (M = 2.69, SD = 0.83) 
did not differ in satisfaction from their counterparts in the prevention condition, (M = 2.76, SD = 
0.99), t(96) = -0.33, ns. 
Copying.  As in Study 1, the choice of method was entered as the dependent variable in a 
logistic regression analysis.  Replicating the results from Study 1, there was a main effect of the 
received method, β = 1.12, z = 2.45, p = .01, indicating a general tendency of copying, and there 
was no main effect of regulatory focus as a situationally induced state, p = .53.  More 
importantly, the analysis yielded a significant interaction between the received method and 
manipulated regulatory focus, β = 1.81, z = 1.97, p < .05, which remained significant after 
controlling for satisfaction with the received method as well as its interaction with the received 
method, β = 3.19, z = 2.62, p < .01.  The received method × regulatory focus interaction is 
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depicted in Figure 2, where participants with an induced prevention focus state tended to choose 
the received method, whereas participants with an induced promotion focus state did not 
demonstrate such a tendency.  Supporting this observation, the simple slope test showed a strong 
tendency to copy only among participants with an induced prevention focus, t(91) = 2.97, p < 
.01, but not among participants with an induced promotion focus, t(91) = 0.54, ns.  Therefore, 
these findings provide further support to Hypothesis 1 that copying is a phenomenon related to 
prevention focus but not to promotion focus. 
In line with Study 1 findings, the results of Study 2 indicated a clear relation between 
prevention focus and copying, independent of hedonic experience.  Moreover, Study 2 supported 
the predicted causal direction of this relation; that is, an experimentally induced prevention focus 
increased the tendency to copy a role model’s managing behavior. 
What remains unclear is the precise mechanism underlying the prevention effects on 
copying.  In other words, what is about copying that fits prevention concerns?  To answer this 
question, Study 3 investigated the normative determination of copying.  Because copying was 
posited to result from the fit between prevention focus and normative concerns, prevention focus 
was not expected to predict copying when a role model’s managing behavior was non-normative.  
Hence, by removing the normative component of a managing behavior, I predicted that 
individuals in a strong prevention focus would not demonstrate the tendency to copy this 
behavior.  Study 3 was designed to test this prediction in the form of a three-way interaction 
between prevention focus, a role model’s managing behavior, and the normative status of this 
behavior.  To support Hypothesis 1, I expected that individuals in a stronger prevention focus 
would copy a managing behavior more when it was normative (a replication of Study 1 and 
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Study 2 findings), but they would not show such a copying tendency when the managing 
behavior was non-normative. 
Study 3 
Methods 
Participants and design.  Ninety-five college students from a Northeastern university 
participated in the experiment, receiving $5 in return.  The study had a 2 (received method: 
harsh, lenient) × 2 (normative status: normative, non-normative) factorial design, and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.  The data of three participants 
who failed to follow the instructions were discarded. 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  For the two normative conditions the experimental 
tasks and procedures were the same as in Study 1.  For the two non-normative conditions the 
rationale for the effectiveness of the received method was removed; instead, the received method 
was said to be a random choice between two methods (i.e., between the harsh and lenient 
methods).  In this way, the received method was dissociated from the managing role, which no 
longer reflected an interpersonal norm.  After reading their test score, as well as the information 
about the grading methods, all participants responded to four items measuring their perception of 
the normativeness of the received method (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  The items 
included statements such as “Compared to the alternative way of calculating scores, the one used 
to calculate my test score is more appropriate/justifiable/legitimate/fair.”  A score averaging 
across the four items (Cronbach’s α = .90) was used in the analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check.  A t-test on the normative perception of the received method 
showed that participants perceived the received method as less normative when it was said to be 
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a random choice (M = 2.43, SD = 0.84) than when it was justified as normative (M = 2.81, SD = 
0.77), t(90) = 2.27, p < .05.  As before, participants in the harsh condition rated the received 
method as more strict (M = 3.77, SD = 0.76) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.72, 
SD = 0.98), t(90) = 5.77, p < .001, and participants in the harsh condition received lower test 
scores (M = 1.67, SD = 2.38) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 8.18, SD = 2.66), 
t(90) = -12.39, p < .001.  Therefore, these manipulations were successful. 
In addition, participants in the harsh condition expressed less satisfaction with the 
received method (M = 2.40, SD = 0.77) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.80, SD = 
0.83), t(90) = -2.36, p < .05.  However, there was no difference in satisfaction between 
participants in the normative condition (M = 2.66, SD = 0.82) and their counterparts in the non-
normative condition (M = 2.50, SD = 0.82), t(90) = 0.94, ns. 
Copying.  Logistic regressions were conducted to test the hypothesized three-way 
interaction between prevention focus, the received method, and its normative status on the choice 
of method.  The analyses yielded no main effect of the received method, β = 0.27, z = 0.62, ns, or 
of its normative status, β = 0.10, z = 0.23, ns.  Neither promotion nor prevention focus had a 
main effect, βs < 0.22, z < 1, ns.  More importantly, a three-way interaction between prevention 
focus, the received method, and its normative status emerged, β = -3.28, z = -2.47, p = .01.  
Further, this three-way interaction still held after controlling for satisfaction and its two- and 
three-way interactions with the received method and its normative status, β = -3.45, z = -2.50, p 
= .01.  The pattern of the three-way prevention focus × received method × normative status 
interaction is plotted in Figure 3. 
Simple slope tests on this three-way interactive effect showed that when the received 
method was justified as normative (the two solid lines in Figure 3), participants with a strong 
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prevention focus tended to copy the received method, t(77) = 1.68, p < .10, whereas participants 
with a weak prevention focus did not show such tendency, t(77) = -1.74, p < .10.  In contrast, 
when the received method was non-normative (the two dotted lines in Figure 3), there was no 
longer a tendency to copy either among those with a strong prevention focus, t(77) = -0.58, ns, or 
among those with a weak prevention focus, t(77) = 1.47, ns3.  These findings support Hypothesis 
1 about the normative determination of copying, such that those with a strong prevention focus 
copy only the normative managing behaviors of a role model.  There was no three-way 
interaction between promotion focus, the received method, and its normative status, β = 0.44, z = 
0.38, ns. 
Given that prevention focus no longer predicts copying when a managing behavior 
becomes non-normative, is it possible that hedonic experience may instead play a role in 
motivating copying?  Indeed, supporting this conjecture, the analysis showed a marginally 
significant interaction between the received method and satisfaction on the choice of method in 
the non-normative condition4, β = 1.67, z = 1.79, p = .07, and this interaction was not significant 
in the normative condition, β = 0.24, z = 0.31, ns.  Furthermore, simple slope tests for the non-
normative condition indicated a marginal tendency to copy among participants who were 
satisfied with the received method, t(34) = 1.72, p = .09, and no such tendency among 
participants who were dissatisfied with the received method, t(34) = -0.90, ns.  Hence, when a 
role model’s managing behavior becomes non-normative, one’s satisfaction with this behavior, 
instead of one’s prevention focus, now tends to predict copying. 
In line with Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 replicated the finding that individuals in a stronger 
prevention focus are more likely to copy a role model’s managing behavior.  Supporting 
Hypothesis 1 about the normative determination of copying, Study 3 revealed that copying 
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occurred only when the managing behavior was normative.  That is, those with a strong 
prevention focus would not copy a non-normative managing behavior.  Instead, regardless of 
their self-regulatory orientation, how individuals earlier felt hedonically about a non-normative 
managing behavior now seemed to predict copying, such that their tendency to copy increased as 
they felt more satisfied with the managing behavior. 
A question still remains regarding the mechanism of copying.  To remove the 
normativeness of a managing behavior, Study 3 not only dissociated this behavior from a 
managing role by claiming it as a random choice, but it also removed the original rationale for its 
effectiveness.  Therefore, an alternative explanation for the absence of copying here is that the 
received method was not considered an effective way to manage the other person.  To rule out 
this possibility, Study 4 restored the normative association between the received method and the 
managing role, but removed the effectiveness of the method by introducing an incongruent 
rationale against its effectiveness.  If copying results from the concerns about the effectiveness of 
a managing behavior, then prevention focus should not predict copying.  But if it is the 
normativeness and not the effectiveness of a managing behavior that matters, then those with a 
strong prevention focus should copy the behavior despite its ineffectiveness. 
Study 4 
Methods 
Participants and design.  Forty-seven college students from a Northeastern university 
participated in the experiment, receiving $5 in return.  They were randomly assigned to either a 
harsh or a lenient method condition.  The data of one participant who failed to follow the 
instructions were discarded. 
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Experimental tasks and procedures.  The experimental tasks and procedures were the 
same as Study 1, except for the rationale presented at the end of the testing task.  Instead of 
advocating the effectiveness of the received method as in Studies 1 and 2, the rationale here 
stated that the alternative method was more effective in improving students’ learning on standard 
tests.  Specifically, participants in the harsh condition read, 
Compared with the method you received, the alternative method (i.e., lenient grading 
method) has shown to be more effective in improving one’s learning on standard tests.  
Because this test emphasizes precision and thoroughness of thinking, which makes it 
difficult to get everything correct, students should be fully rewarded for their partial 
success by this method. 
Participants in the lenient condition read, 
Compared with the method you received, the alternative method (i.e., harsh grading 
method) has shown to be more effective in improving one’s learning on standard tests.  
Because this test emphasizes precision and thoroughness of thinking, which allows no 
mistakes, it is pretty consistent with the high standard reflected in this method. 
After reading the above information, participants responded to three items assessing the 
perceived effectiveness of the received method.  A sample item was “The grading method is 
effective in helping me learn on the test.”  The average score of the three items was used in the 
analysis (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check.  I conducted a t-test on perceived effectiveness of the received 
method across the present study and Study 1, which used the same design but provided a 
justification for the effectiveness of the received method.  As expected, regardless of which 
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method they received, participants in Study 1 judged the received method to be more effective 
(M = 2.87, SD = 0.79) than participants in the present study (M = 2.46, SD = 0.84), t(93) = 2.44, 
p < .05.  In addition, participants in the harsh condition rated the received method as more strict 
(M = 3.52, SD = 1.00) than participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.93, SD = 0.88), t(44) = 
2.12, p < .05, and they also received lower test scores (M = 1.96, SD = 2.92) than those in the 
lenient condition (M = 8.91, SD = 2.11), t(44) = -9.27, p < .001.  Therefore, the manipulation of 
method conditions was successful.  Further, in line with previous studies, participants in the 
harsh condition expressed less satisfaction with the received method (M = 2.12, SD = 0.89) than 
participants in the lenient condition (M = 2.83, SD = 0.84), t(44) = -2.76, p < .01. 
Copying.  The logistic regressions yielded no main effect of the received method on the 
choice of method, β = -0.30, z = -0.47, ns, suggesting no general tendency of participants to 
copy.  Compared to Studies 1 and 2 where a general tendency to copy was found, the absence of 
copying here was likely due to the introduction of an incongruent rationale against the 
effectiveness of the received method.  Neither promotion nor prevention focus had a main effect, 
ps > .60.  Supporting Hypothesis 1 that prevention focus predicts copying independent of 
ineffectiveness concerns, the interaction between prevention focus and the received method was 
significant, β = 2.22, z = 2.35, p < .05, which remained significant after controlling for 
satisfaction and its interaction with the received method, β = 2.20, z = 2.33, p < .05.  As Figure 4 
shows, regardless of which method they received, participants’ tendency to choose the received 
method increased with the strength of their prevention focus.  Simple slope tests consistently 
indicated a tendency to copy among participants with a strong prevention focus, t(37) = 1.52, p = 
.14, and a significant, opposite tendency among participants with a weak prevention focus, t(37) 
= -2.11, p < .05.  The reduced tendency to copy among participants with a strong prevention 
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focus, together with the absent main effect of the received method reported above, might have 
resulted from a shift of preference for the alternative method due to the introduced rationale for 
its effectiveness relative to the received method.  This speculation was supported by the simple 
slope results that participants with a weak prevention focus now exhibited a tendency to choose 
the alternative method over the received method.  As always, the interaction between promotion 
focus and the received method was nonsignificant, β = -1.24, z = -1.55, ns, supporting the notion 
that promotion focus was not associated with copying, and, if anything, the direction was 
opposite. 
Taken together, although the general tendency to copy a role model’s managing behavior 
was weakened by the introduction of an incongruent rationale against the effectiveness of this 
behavior (compared with Study 1), prevention focus remained a significant predictor of copying; 
that is, participants’ tendency to choose the received method increased with the strength of their 
prevention focus.  Thus, for those with a stronger prevention focus, copying is motivated more 
by their normative concerns about the characteristic behaviors associated with a managing role 
than by their effectiveness concerns. 
Study 4 provided further support for the normative determination of copying among 
individuals in a strong prevention focus.  Despite an incongruent rationale against the 
effectiveness of a role model’s managing behavior, prevention focus continued to predict the 
tendency to copy this behavior.  This rules out the alternative explanation that the effectiveness 
concerns motivate copying.  In fact, copying in its general sense does not necessarily serve the 
goal of effectiveness, as perpetuation of norms through conformity can lead to the spread of 
maladaptive behaviors (Feldman & Laland, 1996; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). 
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Studies 1-4 yield consistent findings regarding the tendency to copy a normative 
managing behavior for individuals in a prevention focus.  A drawback of the experimental design 
of these studies is their more limited external validity.  For example, only one managing 
behavior (performance evaluation) and one interpersonal context (grader-student relationship) 
were examined in these studies, leaving open the question whether the findings would generalize 
to diverse managing behaviors in “real world” interpersonal contexts.  To address these issues, I 
conducted a field study to investigate multiple managing behaviors that are common in the 
workplace.  The sample consists of superior-subordinate dyads from various organizations, and 
my goal was to determine whether managers’ prevention focus predicts their tendency to copy 
the managing behaviors of their former superiors.  Because of the status and power held by 
superiors, they often serve as role models for subordinates, and as a result superiors’ behaviors 
represent the normative ways to manage (Decker, 1982; Sims & Manz, 1982; Manz & Sims, 
1981; Latham & Saari, 1979; Weiss, 1977, 1978).  In this line of reasoning, I hypothesized that 
managers’ prevention focus, but not their promotion focus, would predict their tendency to copy 
the managing behaviors of their former superiors, independent of their hedonic experience or 
effectiveness concerns with these behaviors. 
Study 5 
Methods 
Participants.  The sample consisted of 135 superior-subordinate dyads from 
organizations across a wide range of industries, such as financial service, transportation, media, 
energy, research, and government.  The superior subsample included 58 participants, who were 
Executive MBAs holding high-level positions in their organizations, such as being a Chairman or 
Managing Director.  Forty-nine (85%) were men and 9 (15%) were women.  The mean age and 
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tenure were 40.63 years (SD = 5.30) and 18.79 years (SD = 6.99), respectively.  The subordinate 
subsample included 135 participants, who were direct subordinates of the participants in the 
subsample of superiors.  Most of them held middle-level positions in their organizations, such as 
being a Vice-President or Division Manager.  Eighty-eight (65%) of the subordinates were men 
and 47 (35%) were women.  The mean age and tenure were 35.22 years (SD = 6.56) and 12.37 
years (SD = 7.45), respectively.  Responses of 7 superior participants were discarded because of 
no response from their subordinates, leaving 51 participants in the superior subsample.  This 
resulted in a valid superior-subordinate ratio of 1: 2.65, with one to three subordinates per 
superior. 
Procedures.  Surveys were distributed to the superior subsample during one of their class 
sessions.  First, participants recalled one of their former superiors and rated the methods used by 
this superior to manage them.  The exact wording was, “Please recall from your past working 
experience one of your former superiors, who now may or may not be your superior, and to rate 
the extent to which this superior managed you in the following ways.”  By not instructing 
participants to think about any type of superiors at this stage, I hoped to elicit the most accessible 
superior in their mind, with whom the participants might feel satisfied or dissatisfied.  Then, 
participants rated the extent to which this superior had used several methods to manage them, 
including work facilitation, directive leadership, use of legitimate power, monitoring, use of 
coercive power, and negative feedback, evaluated the effectiveness of each method, and reported 
their satisfaction and perceived closeness with their superiors.  Regulatory focus was assessed as 
a chronic disposition using the same questionnaire as in Studies 1, 3, and 4.  Finally, participants 
provided the names and emails of three direct subordinates at work, on the basis of which the 
subordinate subsample was created. 
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The subordinate subsample was invited via email to participate in an online survey.  The 
email listed the name of the superior who provided their contacts, and the confidentiality of the 
completed surveys was guaranteed to all participants.  The return of 135 valid surveys yielded a 
response rate of 77 percent.  Similar to the survey administered to the superior subsample, the 
online survey asked the subordinate subsample to think about their current superiors (if they had 
more than one superior, they needed to think about the one listed in the email), and rate the 
extent to which their superiors had used each method to manage them, as well as their perceived 
closeness with their superiors. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities of the key variables.  
To obtain an objective measure of the managing behaviors of the superior participants, I 
aggregated their subordinates’ ratings on each method they used (rwg’s > .70, ICC[1]’s > .05).  
In addition, I aggregated subordinates’ closeness ratings for each superior (rwg = .74, ICC[1] = 
.11). 
Copying.  Two types of copying were examined in the data analysis.  One is direct 
copying, or same-method copying, which refers to one’s adoption of the same managing 
behavior from a former superior (e.g., using coercive power).  The other is indirect copying, or 
cross-method copying, whereby one’s adoption of a managing behavior (e.g., providing negative 
feedback) is evoked by a different managing behavior of the former superior (e.g., using coercive 
power).  Unlike direct copying that perpetuates the same managing behavior across similar 
relationships, indirect copying refers to a spillover from one managing behavior of a role model 
to another managing behavior of the recipient.  Both types of copying were considered here 
given that social learning is a more complex process than simple imitation.  For example, 
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research on leadership training found that watching videotapes of leadership behaviors induced 
both direct and indirect behavior changes in the trainees (Manz & Sims, 1986). 
I performed the OLS regressions to test Hypothesis 1 that superiors’ prevention focus, but 
not their promotion focus, predicts their tendency to copy the managing behaviors of their former 
superiors.  The dependent variables were subordinate ratings (aggregated) of the extent to which 
superiors used each of the six managing methods.  The independent variables were superiors’ 
prevention focus, promotion focus, and their ratings of the extent to which their former superiors 
had used each method to manage them.  Control variables were superiors’ gender, age, tenure, 
their perceived closeness with their former superiors, and their subordinates’ perceived closeness 
with them. 
The analyses yielded no main effect of superiors’ prevention focus on their managing 
behaviors, all ps > .30.  Promotion focus only had a main effect on work facilitation, β = -0.12, 
t(43) = -2.27, p < .05, but not on the other five managing behaviors, ps > .10.  I did not find any 
main effect of former superiors’ managing behaviors, ps > .10.  However, of the thirty-six 
possible interactive effects between superiors’ prevention focus and their former superiors’ 
managing behaviors on their own managing behaviors, four were significant.  The significant 
interactive effects supported Hypothesis 1 by highlighting the fact that superiors with a stronger 
prevention focus were more likely to copy the managing methods from their former superiors.  In 
particular, two of the four significant interactions reflected direct copying, and the other two 
reflected indirect copying.  In contrast, none of the interactions between promotion focus and 
former superiors’ managing behaviors was significant, all ps > .10. 
Monitoring was the first managing behavior that was directly copied by superiors with a 
strong prevention focus.  Superiors’ prevention focus and their former superiors’ monitoring had 
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an interaction effect on their own monitoring, β = 0.24, t(40) = 2.84, p < .01, which remained 
significant after controlling for satisfaction with the former superior and its interaction with the 
former superior’s monitoring, β = 0.25, t(38) = 2.79, p < .01.  As Figure 5a shows, superiors with 
a strong prevention focus were more likely to use monitoring if their former superiors had used a 
lot of monitoring, t(40) = 2.41, p < .05, whereas superiors with a weak prevention focus did not 
show such tendency.  Instead, they even showed a reverse tendency, t(40) = -1.76, p = .09. 
Use of coercive power was another managing behavior that was directly copied by 
superiors with a strong prevention focus.  Superiors’ prevention focus and their former superiors’ 
use of coercive power had an interaction effect on their own use of coercive power, β = 0.24, 
t(40) = 2.44, p < .05, which remained significant after controlling for satisfaction with the former 
superior and its interaction with the former superior’s use of coercive power, β = 0.26, t(38) = 
2.53, p < .05.  As Figure 5b shows, superiors with a strong prevention focus were more likely to 
use coercive power if their former superiors had used a lot of coercive power, t(40) = 1.71, p = 
.10, whereas superiors with a weak prevention focus showed a reversed tendency, t(40) = -1.89, 
p = .07. 
Besides direct copying, superiors with a strong prevention focus also engaged in indirect 
copying, which represents a “spillover” from one managing behavior to another.  The first 
indirect copying was the spillover from the use of coercive power to the use of negative 
feedback.  Specifically, superiors’ prevention focus and their former superiors’ use of coercive 
power had an interaction effect on their own use of negative feedback, β = 0.21, t(40) = 2.29, p < 
.05, which remained significant after controlling for satisfaction with the former superior and its 
interaction with the former superior’s use of coercive power, β = 0.20, t(38) = 2.06, p < .05.  As 
Figure 5c shows, superiors with a strong prevention focus were more likely to use negative 
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feedback if their former superiors had used a lot of coercive power, t(40) = 2.22, p < .05, where 
superiors with a weak prevention focus did not show such tendency, t(40) = -0.72, ns. 
Another indirect copying was the spillover from the use of negative feedback to 
monitoring.  Superiors’ prevention focus and their former superiors’ use of negative feedback 
had an interaction effect on their own monitoring, β = 0.25, t(40) = 2.47, p < .05, which remained 
significant after controlling for satisfaction with the former superior and its interaction with the 
former superior’s use of negative feedback, β = 0.26, t(38) = 2.52, p < .05.  As Figure 5d shows, 
superiors with a strong prevention focus were more likely to monitor their subordinates if their 
former superiors had used a lot of negative feedback, t(40) = 2.74, p < .01, where superiors with 
a weak prevention focus did not show this tendency, t(40) = -0.99, ns. 
Perceived effectiveness.  I also tested whether superiors’ perceived effectiveness of a 
managing behavior predicted their tendency to copy this behavior.  No evidence was found to 
support this possibility.  The only main effect was that superiors’ perceived effectiveness of their 
former superiors’ monitoring was negatively related to their own use of monitoring, β = -0.11, 
t(28) = -2.32, p < .05, suggesting, if anything, a tendency against monitoring when it was 
perceived as an effective method.  Overall, perceived effectiveness did not predict direct or 
indirect copying, all ps > .10.  Hence, these findings indicate that the perceived effectiveness of a 
managing method did not predict copying, which is consistent with the findings of Study 4. 
Extending the experimental findings to the field, Study 5 provided consistent support for 
Hypothesis 1 that prevention focus predicts the tendency to copy the managing behaviors of a 
role model.  Despite their dissatisfaction with former superiors who used monitoring, coercive 
power, or negative feedback, superiors with a stronger prevention focus still demonstrated a 
stronger tendency to copy these behaviors, in both direct and indirect ways.  These results lend 
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additional support to the proposal that copying derives from the fit between prevention focus and 
normative influence, independent of one’s hedonic experience and effectiveness concerns. 
In Study 5, the three “harsh” methods copied by prevention-focused superiors 
(monitoring, coercive power, negative feedback) were all negatively related to satisfaction (βs < -
.40, t(49)s < -2.0, all ps < .05).  In contrast, none of the more “lenient” methods (work 
facilitation, legitimate power, directive leadership) that were positively related to satisfaction (βs 
> .60, t(49)s > 4.0, all ps < .001) was copied by these superiors.  This is different than the 
experimental studies (Studies 1-4) where prevention focus predicts copying both harsh and 
lenient methods.  What might account for this difference?  Because positive events are more 
common and expected in everyday life, they tend to be perceived as the default (Hamilton & 
Huffman, 1971).  For example, superiors are usually advised to behave in ways that improve 
subordinate satisfaction.  As a result, adopting satisfying managing methods may not depend on 
individual factors.  In contrast, due to their infrequent occurrence and potential threat, negative 
events tend to be salient (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001) and thus copying them depends more on individual factors.  Given this, the 
dissatisfying managing behaviors may be more likely to be registered and copied by prevention-
focused recipients. 
This does not mean that superiors did not engage in the managing behaviors that 
improved subordinate satisfaction.  In fact, the superior subsample performed more satisfying 
managing behaviors, such as work facilitation (M = 3.40, SD = 0.82), directive leadership (M = 
3.37, SD = 0.88), and use of legitimate power (M = 3.86, SD = 0.92) than dissatisfying managing 
behaviors, such as use of negative feedback (M = 2.16, SD = 0.65), monitoring (M = 2.49, SD = 
0.71), and use of coercive power (M = 1.74, SD = 0.82), t(50)s > 5, ps < .001.  In addition, except 
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for a main effect of promotion focus on work facilitation, there were no other main effects of 
prevention focus, promotion focus, or prior experiences with former superiors on any of the 
superiors’ managing behaviors.  Taken together, these results suggested that all superiors 
employed more managing behaviors that enhanced subordinate satisfaction, regardless of their 
prevention or promotion focus, and they did so not because they were copying these behaviors 
from former superiors, but because these behaviors were deemed as the default ways to manage.  
Where I expected to see differences in copying was on the non-default, dissatisfying behaviors, 
and I did find that prevention-focused superiors were more likely to copy these behaviors, 
independent of their hedonic experience or effectiveness concerns. 
The reason that the experimental studies (Studies 1-4) did not exhibit this negativity bias 
may be that both the harsh and lenient methods used in these studies were relatively uncommon, 
that is, they were not the default method.  Neither the harsh nor the lenient method was a 
standard method compared to a normal method that awards partial credit for a single question, 
and therefore both methods should be salient and register in one’s mind and the choice to copy 
them depends more on individual factors.  In fact, participants in one of the pilot studies were 
given the choice of a normal method (i.e., students get partial score for a single question) in 
addition to the harsh and lenient methods, and most participants chose the normal method, 
regardless of their regulatory focus or the method they received earlier.  For this reason, if the 
normal method were included as a choice in the experimental studies, it should function in the 
same way as the satisfying managing behaviors in Study 5 (e.g. work facilitation, legitimate 
power, directive leadership).  In this sense, what I found in the field study was consistent with 
what I would find in the experimental studies if the latter had included a normal method choice. 
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Studies 1-5 explored the role of prevention focus in copying the behaviors of others, or in 
a more general sense, following the precedent behavior demonstrated by someone else.  The 
studies to follow were conducted to extend these findings by examining the tendency to follow 
the precedent behavior engaged in by oneself.  In other words, does prevention focus also predict 
one’s tendency to repeat their own behavior in the past, even when this behavior may involve 
ethical issues (Hypothesis 2)? 
Study 6 
In Study 6, participants completed two consecutive tasks that each presented an 
opportunity to cheat for potential monetary gain.  Reflecting a slippery slope pattern, cheating on 
the first task was framed as a default option and limited to a trivial amount, whereas cheating on 
the second task required intentional action and was not limited in extent.  I predicted that 
participants with a strong prevention focus would exhibit repeated cheating behaviors, in a way 
that they would be more likely to cheat on the second task after cheating on the first task. 
Methods 
Participants.  Sixty-three individuals (44 males) recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk participated in an online study.  In addition to receiving $0.90 for completing the study, 
participants could win a lottery of additional $100.  Mean age was 30.27 years old (SD = 8.38).  
Thirty-two percent identified themselves as “White”, 57% as “Asian/Pacific Islander”, 6% as 
“American Indian/Alaska Native”, 2% as “Hispanic”, and 3% as “Other”.  Half of them spoke 
English as native language, and the other half reported an average English proficiency score of 
5.66 on a 7-point Likert scale (1 “very poor”, 7 “native speaker”; SD = 0.60).  Gender did not 
have an effect in any of the analyses5. 
  
39 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  The online study ostensibly investigated the 
relation between general knowledge and creativity.  The study included two consecutive tasks: 1) 
a general knowledge quiz, and 2) an anagram task that allegedly assessed creativity.  Participants 
were informed that they could win a lottery of additional $50 on each task if their performance 
ranked in the top half of all participants.  The lottery provided an incentive for cheating, as 
participants had a chance to inflate their task performance when they were asked to double check 
their test scores that were said to be calculated by a new data collection system (Weiss & Johar, 
2011). 
The general knowledge quiz included two sections that totaled 100 points; each section 
contained 10 questions (e.g., “How far can a kangaroo jump?” “Which is the longest river in the 
world?”).  The questions were chosen from a pilot set to be difficult enough to prevent 
participants’ suspicion about the predetermined feedback that they received later.  Participants 
were told that the average quiz score of previous participants was around 70 points.  After 
completing the first section, all participants read the same feedback information that they had 
answered correctly 6 out of 10 questions that summed up to a total of 12 of 20 possible points 
(each question worth 2 points).  They then read the following message: 
The following number of points will be added to your record toward the lottery: 
12 
Participants indicated whether the above score was consistent with the feedback 
information by accepting or rejecting the score.  If they rejected the score, they would be 
prompted to enter the correct score.  All participants were expected to accept the above score, 
which was consistent with the feedback information.  Having participants judge a consistent 
score in the first section served two goals: 1) to provide practice on the quiz before they reached 
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the second section that detected initial cheating behavior; 2) to mask the true purpose of the 
study in case participants doubted why they could edit the scores. 
Then participants completed the second section of the quiz, and they received the same 
feedback information that they had answered correctly 7 out of 10 questions that summed up to a 
total of 56 of 80 possible points (each worth 8 points).  Then they read the following message: 
The following number of points will be added to your record toward the lottery: 
65 
Once again participants were asked to accept or reject the above score, which presented a 
slight inflation compared with the feedback information.  Participants would exhibit cheating 
behaviors by accepting this score or entering an inflated score after rejecting this score. 
The next task included 15 anagram puzzles that allegedly assessed creativity.  
Participants were asked to try their best to solve as many anagrams as they could.  Before 
submitting their answers, participants viewed the key to each anagram and were instructed to 
report their performance after comparing their answers with the key.  Doing so offered 
participants a chance to edit their original answers and report inflated performance.  Finally, 
participants responded to questions that measured their promotion and prevention foci using the 
same regulatory focus questionnaire as Study 1, as well as demographics questions. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial cheating.  Initial cheating was measured by a binary variable (0 no cheating, 1 
cheating).  Rejecting the inflated score of 65 on the second section of the general knowledge 
quiz and entering the consistent score of 56 were coded as 0.  Accepting the inflated score of 65 
or entering another inflated score (e.g., 60) after rejecting the inflated score of 65 was coded as 1. 
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Of all 63 participants, 43 (68%) cheated on the general knowledge quiz.  The finding that 
a majority of the participants cheated was consistent with data on similar designs (Weiss & 
Johar, 2011) and confirmed the non-threatening nature of this cheating.  A logistic regression 
showed that initial cheating was not affected by self-regulatory orientations, as neither promotion 
focus (B = -0.41, p = .16) nor prevention focus (B = -0.24, p = .40) had a main effect. 
Subsequent cheating.  Consistent with previous research that measures cheating through 
self-report performance (e.g., Gino & Galinsky, 2012; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Mazar et al., 
2008), subsequent cheating was probed by self-report performance on the anagram task.  
Participants’ submitted answer to each of the 15 anagrams was coded as a self-report indicator 
(1: correct; 0: incorrect), resulting in a multilevel data structure with 15 anagram levels nested 
within each participant level. 
The percentages of participants claiming to have solved 0 to 15 anagrams follow a 
bimodal distribution, with more than 40% of participants claiming 2 anagrams or less and 30% 
claiming 13 anagrams or more (Figure 6a).  Mean self-report performance was 6.68 anagrams 
(SD = 5.80), and participants who did not cheat in the general knowledge quiz reported a slightly 
higher performance (M = 7.25, SD = 5.72) than participants who cheated in the quiz (M = 6.42, 
SD = 5.89).   
The measure of subsequent cheating, namely, the self-report indicator on each anagram, 
was submitted to Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) for binary outcomes, with anagram levels 
(level 1) nested within participant levels (level 2).  Initial cheating and prevention focus were 
entered as level-2 predictors, with promotion focus entered as a level-2 covariate.  There was no 
effect of prevention focus, B = 0.01, t(58) = 0.07, p = .95, or promotion focus, B = 0.06, t(58) = 
0.35, p = .73, on subsequent cheating.  Initial cheating did not have an effect either, B = -0.14, 
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t(58) = -0.34, p = .74.  However, a significant interaction emerged between initial cheating and 
prevention focus, B = 1.06, t(56) = 2.96, p = .005.  As Figure 6b shows, participants with a 
stronger prevention focus reported higher anagram performance after cheating on the general 
knowledge quiz.  Interestingly, Figure 6b also shows a tendency for these participants to repeat 
honest behaviors.  Confirming these observations, a simple slope test performed at one standard 
deviation above the mean of prevention focus (strong prevention focus) indicated a positive 
relation between initial and subsequent cheating, t(56) = 1.76, p = .04.  Therefore, Hypothesis 2 
was supported.  Participants with a weaker prevention focus exhibited an opposite pattern, in that 
they reported lower anagram performance after cheating on the quiz (moral cleansing) or higher 
performance after acting honestly on the quiz (moral licensing).  Indeed, a simple slope test 
performed at one standard deviation below the mean of prevention focus (weak prevention 
focus) revealed a negative relation between initial cheating and subsequent cheating, t(56) = -
2.23, p = .01.  The interaction between initial cheating and promotion focus did not have a 
significant effect on subsequent cheating, B = 0.14, t(56) = 0.39, p = .70. 
Study 6 revealed the important role of prevention focus in predicting repeated unethical 
behaviors.  Using self-report performance as an indicator of cheating, I found a tendency to 
repeat unethical behaviors only among individuals with a strong prevention focus, who were 
more likely to inflate performance for potential monetary gain after cheating on a previous task. 
Moreover, the fact that stronger prevention focus did not directly affect initial or subsequent 
cheating confirmed the notion that this self-regulatory motive functions to maintain the ethical 




Although self-report provides a reliable indicator of performance inflation, it is limited in 
pinpointing the cheating behavior of a specific individual.  This issue was addressed in Study 7, 
which obtained measures of both self-report and true performance in a laboratory setting.  By 
comparing the two measures, I could determine the exact ethical behavior of each participant. 
Methods 
Participants.  Eighty-seven college students (30 males) from a Northeastern university 
participated in an experiment ostensibly on general knowledge and creativity, receiving a show-
up payment of $5.  Participants were also told that they could be entered in a lottery to win an 
additional $200.  Mean age was 22.72 years old (SD = 4.71).  Twenty-nine percent identified 
themselves as “White”, 7% as “African American”, 53% as “Asian/Pacific Islander”, 1% as 
“American Indian/Alaska Native”, 7% as “Hispanic”, and 3% as “Other”.  Sixty percent spoke 
English as native language, and the rest reported an average English proficiency score of 5.77 on 
a 7-point Likert scale (1 “very poor”, 7 “native speaker”; SD = 0.84). 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  The tasks and procedures were identical to Study 6 
except for three differences: 1) participants completed the study on computer in a laboratory 
setting instead of online; 2) prevention and promotion foci were measured as chronic 
dispositions at the beginning instead of at the end of the study; 3) subsequent cheating was 
measured using the Carbonless Anagram Method instead of self-report performance, as the 
former detects intentional unethical acts at the individual level in an inconspicuous manner 
(Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2011).  After participants completed the general knowledge quiz by 
accepting or rejecting the inflated score, they each received a sealed manila folder containing 
three paper sheets.  The top sheet was a white regular paper that printed 15 anagram questions on 
the front and two filler questions on the back (“How difficult was this task?” and “How 
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enjoyable was this task?”; 1 not at all, 7 very much).  The middle sheet was a white carbonless 
paper with a chemical coating on the back, and on the front printed another task that would mask 
any mark recorded on the bottom sheet.  The bottom sheet was a carbonless paper with a 
chemical coating on the front, where pressure (e.g., a pen mark) on the top sheet would leave an 
identical mark. 
Participants wrote down their answer to each anagram puzzle on the front of the top 
sheet.  When finished, they were instructed to remove the top sheet from the folder to answer the 
two filler questions on the back.  Meanwhile, the experimenter collected the folder containing the 
bottom sheet that recorded participants’ true performance, telling participants that they no longer 
needed the folder as there was not enough time left for the other task in the folder.  Left with 
only the top sheet that recorded their original answers, participants were presented with the 
anagram key.  They were asked to transfer their answers from the top sheet to the computer by 
entering each answer into the computer, and to report the number of anagrams they correctly 
solved.  Participants were also told that the experimenter would not collect the top sheet and they 
should recycle it outside the lab after the study.  Finally, participants completed the 
demographics questions, were paid and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial cheating.  Initial cheating was measured in the same way as in Study 6 (0 no 
cheating, 1 cheating).  Of all 87 participants, 50 (57%) cheated on the general knowledge quiz.  
Fewer participants cheated here than in Study 6, probably due to less privacy in the laboratory 
than an online setting.  Still a majority of the participants cheated, lending additional evidence to 
the non-threatening nature of initial cheating.  Consistent with Study 6 findings, neither 
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prevention focus (B = -0.29, p = .20) nor promotion focus (B = -0.36, p = .12) affected initial 
cheating. 
Subsequent cheating.  Subsequent cheating was measured by a binary variable (0 no 
cheating, 1 cheating).  For each participant, reporting true anagram performance was coded as 0, 
and reporting inflated anagram performance was coded as 1.  The unfilled bars of Figure 7a 
show the percentages of participants claiming to solve 0 to 15 anagrams, which follow a 
positively skewed distribution.  This contrasts with the bimodal distribution in Study 6 (Figure 
6a), particularly in the markedly reduced percentage of participants who reported having solved 
over 10 anagrams.  Again, this drop might be due to the feelings of less privacy in a controlled 
laboratory environment.  The filled bars of Figure 7a show the percentages of participants 
inflating 0 to 9 anagrams.  Out of all 87 participants, 27 (31%) inflated their anagram 
performance.  More specifically, among the 50 participants who cheated on the initial quiz, 18 
cheated on the anagram task; among the other 37 participants who did not cheat on the quiz, 9 
cheated later.  Compared with the initial cheating rate (57%), the subsequent cheating rate was 
much lower, which was expected because initial cheating involved passive acceptance of an 
inflated score, whereas subsequent cheating required intentional and deliberate action. 
Logistic regressions were performed on the binary measure of subsequent cheating (0 no 
cheating, 1 cheating).  Prevention focus and initial cheating were entered as predictors, and 
promotion focus was entered as covariate.  As in Study 6, there was no main effect of prevention 
focus (B = 0.13, p = .58), promotion focus (B = 0.02, p = .94), or initial cheating (B = 0.60, p = 
.22).  Hypothesis 2 was supported again, as the analyses yielded a significant interaction between 
prevention focus and initial cheating, B = 1.18, z = 2.17, p = .03.  As Figure 7b shows, 
participants with a stronger prevention focus were more likely to repeat on the anagram task 
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what they had previously done on the quiz (i.e., either repeating cheating or repeating non-
cheating), t(81) = 2.27, p = .03.  In contrast, for participants with a weaker prevention focus, 
their initial and subsequent choices were unrelated, t(81) = -0.85, p = .40.  Like Study 1, the 
interaction between promotion focus and initial cheating did not predict subsequent cheating, B = 
0.25, z = 0.51, p = .61. 
Using a behavioral measure to pinpoint subsequent cheating at the individual level, Study 
7 provided additional evidence for Hypothesis 2.  Despite the different settings (online vs. 
experimental) and samples (MTurkers vs. college students) for Studies 6 and 7, stronger 
prevention focus remained predictive of persistence in unethical behaviors.  Individuals in a 
weak prevention focus also exhibited a similar trend to Study 6 by showing a moral cleansing or 
licensing effect, although this effect did not reach significance in Study 7. 
Study 8 
Regulatory focus was measured as chronic dispositions in Studies 6 and 7.  Study 8 
aimed to replicate these results when a prevention focus or a promotion focus was situationally 
induced.  More importantly, the experimental induction of regulatory focus allowed a test of the 
causal relation between prevention focus and persistence in own unethical behavior. 
Methods 
Participants and design.  Eighty college students (28 males) from a Northeastern 
university participated in the experiment.  As in Study 7, they received $5 for participation and 
an opportunity to win an additional $200.  Mean age was 23.20 years old (SD = 3.61).  A third of 
participants identified themselves as “White”, 6% as “African American”, 48% as “Asian/Pacific 
Islander”, 1% as “American Indian/Alaska Native”, 6% as “Hispanic”, and 6% as “Other”.  
Fifty-eight percent spoke English as native language, and the rest reported an average English 
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proficiency score of 5.45 on a 7-point Likert scale (1 “very poor”, 7 “native speaker”; SD = 
0.95).  Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions to have an induced prevention or 
promotion focus. The experimental tasks and procedures were identical to Study 7 except that we 
used both incidental manipulation and framing to consistently induce a prevention or promotion 
focus. 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were 
asked to pilot an allegedly unrelated task.  The task showed a cartoon mouse trapped inside a 
maze, and participants were asked to draw the pathway for the mouse to escape the maze.  In the 
prevention focus condition, an owl was hovering above the maze, ready to swoop down and 
snatch the mouse.  In the promotion focus condition, instead of the owl, a piece of Swiss cheese 
was lying outside the maze.  Previous research shows that the owl and cheese serve as incidental 
cues that activate prevention and promotion foci, respectively (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2001; 
Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah, & Brazy, 2007). 
For both the general knowledge quiz and the anagram task, the incentive messages were 
framed in a prevention- or promotion-focus manner to induce the same orientation as the cartoon 
cues.  Following the standard procedures of regulatory focus framing (Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998), the prevention-focus 
messages emphasized relative losses (in the negative domain) and nonlosses (in the positive 
domain).  Specifically, participants were told that they had been entered in a $100 lottery for 
each task but would be removed from the lottery if their performance ranked in the bottom half 
of all participants (i.e., poor performance).  In contrast, the promotion-focus messages 
emphasized relative gains (in the positive domain) or nongains (in the negative domain).  
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Specifically, participants were told that they could be entered in a $100 lottery if their 
performance ranked in the top half of all participants (i.e., good performance). 
Results and Discussion 
Initial cheating.  Comparable to Study 7, 40 out of 80 (50%) participants cheated on the 
general knowledge quiz.  Once again, initial cheating was not affected by induced regulatory 
focus, B = -0.50, p = .26. 
Subsequent cheating.  Also comparable to Study 7, 24 out of 80 (30%) participants 
inflated their anagram performance.  As Figure 8a shows, the percentages of participants 
claiming to solve 0 to 15 anagrams follow a positively skewed distribution (unfilled bars).  So do 
the percentages of participants inflating 0 to 9 anagrams (filled bars).  Specifically, among the 40 
participants who previously cheated on the quiz, 13 cheated on the anagram task later; among the 
other 40 participants who did not cheat on the quiz, 11 cheated later. 
Logistic regressions were conducted on the binary measure of subsequent cheating (0 no 
cheating, 1 cheating).  Consistent with previous results, Hypothesis 2 was supported, in that 
neither regulatory focus induction (B = 0.35, p = .48) nor initial cheating (B = 0.28, p = .57) had 
a main effect, but their interaction was significant, B = -2.45, z = 2.18, p = .03.  As Figure 8b 
shows, participants with an induced prevention focus were more likely to repeat on the anagram 
task what they had done on the initial quiz (either repeating cheating or repeating non-cheating), 
χ2(1, N = 41) = 4.04, p = .04.  Although participants with an induced promotion focus exhibited a 
similar trend to weak prevention participants in Studies 6 and 7, such that their initial cheating 
tended to deter subsequent cheating and initial non-cheating tended to license subsequent 
cheating, this trend was nonsignificant, χ2(1, N = 39) = 1.30, p = .25. 
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By experimentally inducing prevention focus, Study 8 supported the hypothesized causal 
direction of strong prevention individuals repeating unethical behaviors.  One limitation of 
Studies 6-8 was their focus on one type of unethical behavior—performance inflation—in an 
independent decision-making context, raising the question of whether the findings would 
generalize to other unethical behaviors and to different contexts.  Study 8 was conducted to 
address this question in a two-party negotiation context, where one party could mislead the other 
party by not disclosing information that might alter the outcome of a negotiation (Tenbrunsel, 
1998). 
Study 9 
Study 9 tested the hypothesized relation between strong prevention focus and repeated 
unethical behaviors in a socially interactive context—two-party negotiations, where unethical 
behaviors were reflected in one party’s failure to disclose relevant information to the other party 
(Kern & Chugh, 2009).  In this study, participants were paired up to conduct two rounds of 
negotiation over the sale of a property, and those playing the buyer role (buyers) could reach a 
deal or lower the purchase price by not disclosing their intended use of the property to those 
playing the seller role (sellers).  By tracking how buyers conveyed their intentions to sellers 
across the two rounds of negotiation, the role of prevention focus in buyers’ tendency to 
repeatedly not disclose information could be determined. 
Methods 
Participants and design.  Eighty-six college students (30 males) from a Northeastern 
university participated in a study ostensibly on negotiation strategies.  They received $8 for 
participation and an opportunity to win an additional $200.  Mean age was 22.47 years old (SD = 
4.31).  Forty-two percent identified themselves as “White”, 12% as “African American”, 29% as 
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“Asian/Pacific Islander”, 10% as “American Indian/Alaska Native”, 7% as “Hispanic”.  Given 
the communicative nature of negotiations, the study recruited individuals highly proficient in 
English proficiency.  Seventy-four percent were native speakers, and the rest reported an average 
proficiency score of 6.18 on a 7-point Likert scale (1 “very poor”, 7 “native speaker”; SD = 
0.59).  Participants were paired into 43 dyads and randomly assigned to the buyer or seller role.  
Buyers were further randomly assigned to two conditions to have an induced prevention or 
promotion focus. 
Experimental tasks and procedures.  First, all participants read three negotiation 
strategies individually: 1) making aggressive first offers; 2) asking the other party’s intentions; 
and 3) determining the “walk-away” position (see Appendix for details).  Then they conducted 
two rounds of negotiation.  For each round, they completed a pre-negotiation questionnaire to 
specify how they would apply the three strategies to the negotiation.  When finished with 
negotiating, participants completed a post-negotiation questionnaire that contained our dependent 
measures. 
The first negotiation was over the sale of a used car.  The seller was willing to settle at a 
reasonable price ($500), knowing that the car might be valuable as a classic ($10,000) with an 
expensive fix-up.  The buyer was looking for parts to restore another car as a classic ($8,000) 
and found all the parts needed in the seller’s car.  Thus, the buyer had the incentive to not 
disclose the intended use of the car to the seller as it might raise the seller’s asking price.  Given 
that the buyer’s intention represented superior information relevant to the transaction that was 
not accessible to the seller and could affect the outcome of the negotiation once revealed to the 
seller, failure to disclose this information to the seller was potentially fraudulent (Shell, 1991).  
Participants then played the same roles in the second negotiation, which was over the sale of a 
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real estate property (adapted from the Bullard Houses case; Karp, Gold, & Tan, 1998).  Sellers 
represented the owner of the property who had a strong desire to sell it for residential use.  
Buyers were instructed by their client to not disclose the commercial use planned for the 
property.  Thus, buyers again had the incentive to not disclose the intended use of the property to 
sellers.  Because sellers’ decision to reach a deal depended on the vital information on how 
buyers intended to use the property, buyers had the duty to disclose this information and failing 
to do so was considered as fraudulent (Shell, 1991).  The buyers’ data were of focal interest. 
For both negotiations, performance incentives were presented as part of the role 
information.  Like Study 8, the incentives for buyers were framed to induce a prevention or 
promotion focus.  Specifically, buyers in the prevention focus condition were told that they were 
currently entered in a lottery to win an additional $100 but would be removed from this lottery if 
their purchase price was above the average of all buyers (i.e., a poor price).  If no deal was 
reached, there would be a 50% chance of them being removed from the lottery.  Buyers in the 
promotion focus condition were told that they would be entered in a lottery to win an additional 
$100 if their purchase price was below the average of all buyers (i.e., a good price).  If no deal 
was reached, there would be a 50% chance of them being entered in the lottery.  All sellers read 
the same incentives that they would/would not be in the lottery to win an additional $100 if their 
sale price was above/below the average of all sellers.  If no deal was reached, there would be a 
50% chance of them being in the lottery. 
Results and Discussion 
Initial failure to disclose.  Two measures were obtained from the first negotiation to 
measure initial failure to disclose: a behavioral and a self-report measure.  The behavioral 
measure captured buyers’ conveyed intention for the used car by considering both buyers’ and 
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sellers’ reports of what buyers said about their intentions for the car (e.g., driving, restoring 
another car using its part, etc.).  Two research assistants independently coded these reports into a 
binary variable (0: disclosure of the intended use, 1: failure to disclose the intended use).  Their 
codings converged for 39 out of 43 dyads (91%), and the remaining discrepancies were 
thoroughly discussed before a final consensus was reached.  The self-report measure was 
developed from buyers’ responses to whether they had disclosed the consequences of their 
position to the opponent (0: yes, 1: no; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). 
The behavioral measure showed that 25 out of 43 (58%) buyers did not disclose their 
intentions in the first negotiation.  Similarly, the self-report measure showed that 26 out of 43 
(60%) buyers did not disclose.  Consistent with previous findings, regulatory focus induction did 
not affect the behavioral measure, χ2(1, N = 43) = 0.02, p = .90, or the self-report measure, χ2(1, 
N = 43) = 1.12, p = .29, of initial failure to disclose. 
Subsequent failure to disclose.  Behavioral and self-report measures of subsequent 
failure to disclose were created in the same way as those of initial failure to disclose, based on 
both buyers’ and sellers’ responses pertaining to buyers’ intentions in the second negotiation.  
The behavioral measure showed that 36 out of 43 (84%) buyers did not disclose their intentions 
in the second negotiation.  Consistently, the self-report measure indicated that 35 out of 43 
(81%) buyers did not disclose.  Compared with the first negotiation, the marked increase in the 
rate of failure to disclose here was likely due to the role instruction that explicitly asked buyers 
not to reveal the intended use of the property under any circumstances.  As in Studies 6-8, 
regulatory focus did not affect the behavioral measure, χ2(1, N = 43) = 1.37, p = .24, or the self-
report measure, χ2(1, N = 43) = 0.01, p = .94, of subsequent failure to disclose. 
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Unlike previous studies, initial and subsequent failures to disclose were positively related 
when they were both assessed by behavioral measures, χ2(1, N = 43) = 6.61, p = .01, or by self-
report measures, χ2(1, N = 43) = 5.17, p = .02. Specifically, more of the participants who had not 
disclosed their intentions in the first negotiation chose to do so in the second negotiation (24 out 
of 25 for behavioral measures; 24 out of 26 for self-report measures) than those who had 
previously disclosed their intentions (12 out of 18 for behavioral measures; 11 out of 17 for self-
report measures). Further analyses showed that this relation was driven by an interaction between 
regulatory focus induction and initial failure to disclose, which was revealed by both behavioral 
measures, χ2(1, N = 43) = 13.27, p < .001, and self-report measures, χ2(1, N = 43) = 6.50, p = .01. 
As Figure 9a (behavioral measure) and Figure 9b (self-report measure) show, buyers with an 
induced prevention focus tended to repeat their previous decision on whether to disclose their 
intentions, χ2(1, N = 22) = 9.35, p < .01 (behavioral measures), χ2(1, N = 22) = 4.20, p = .04 
(self-report measures), whereas buyers with an induced promotion focus did not show this 
tendency, χ2(1, N = 21) = 0.05, p = .83 (behavioral measures), χ2(1, N = 21) = 1.49, p = .22 (self-
report measures).  These findings thus supported Hypothesis 2. 
In sum, Study 9 provides further support for Hypothesis 2 regarding the role of a strong 
prevention focus in repeating behaviors with potential unethical connotations: being in an 
induced prevention focus motivated individuals to continuously withhold relevant information 
from their negotiation opponent.  Bringing additional value to the previous studies, this study 
generalizes the central finding to a social-interactive setting, and broadens the scope of unethical 
behaviors to include failure to disclose during a negotiation.  As a long-standing issue, failure to 
disclose information to stakeholders not only attracts attention and debate in the corporate world 
(Pfarrer, 2008; Shell, 1991), but also characterizes ethical issues prevalent in many domains 
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including medical, legal, and environmental services (e.g., Cormier, Gordon, & Magnan, 2004; 
Finkelstein, Wu, Holtzman, & Smith, 1997; Newberg, 2004).  Although failure to disclose was 
measured here as a negotiation-specific behavior, our findings may speak to a wide range of 
misconducts from legitimate nondisclosure to fraudulent misstatement. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Why would people repeat the follies of the past? The present research explores the self-
regulatory processes that motivate repetition of a prior behavior that could be unpleasant, 
ineffective, and even unethical.  Depending on whether the prior behavior is committed by others 
or by oneself, I examined two forms of repetition: 1) copying the managing behaviors of a role 
model (Studies 1-5), and 2) persisting in one’s own unethical behavior (Studies 6-9).  Applying 
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to the analysis of each form of repetition, I argue 
that the prevention aspect of self-regulation (i.e., prevention focus) motivates both copying 
others and persisting in oneself.  Concerned about avoiding negative deviations from the status 
quo, prevention focus is associated with the tendency to maintain the status quo, which is a fit 
experience that transcends concerns about the hedonic, utilitarian, and ethical value of the status 
quo. 
The first set of studies, comprised of four experiments and a field study, offered 
converging support for the role of prevention focus in repeating the managing behaviors of a role 
model.  Across two different types of relationships (grader–student, superior–subordinate) and 
multiple managing behaviors (performance evaluation, monitoring, and use of power), I found 
consistent evidence for the hypothesis that being in a prevention focus, either measured as a 
chronic disposition (Studies 1, 3, 4, 5) or induced as a psychological state (Study 2), motivated 
the tendency to copy the managing behaviors of a role model.  The findings also supported the 
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normative determination of copying (Study 3) and transcendence of copying as a fit experience 
over hedonic (Studies 1-5) and effective concerns (Studies 4 & 5).  Finally, the experimental 
findings were generalized to an organizational setting (Study 5), where superiors in a prevention 
focus tended to copy the managing behaviors from their former superiors6. 
 The second set of studies including four experiments revealed that a relatively minor 
misconduct resulted in more significant ethical violation, a slippery slope effect observed only 
among individuals in a prevention focus.  This effect was first manifested in two rounds of 
independent decision-making, and participants in a chronic prevention focus (Studies 6 & 7) or 
an induced prevention focus (Study 8) tended to intentionally overstate performance after 
previously accepting an overstated performance score.  It was replicated in a two-party 
negotiation context (Study 9): for participants in an induced prevention focus, their initial choice 
to not disclose relatively trivial information to the opponent increased the likelihood of not 
disclosing more critical information later.  This thus attests to the notion that repeating a prior 
behavior represents a deeper prevention motivation that operates beyond ethical concerns. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 The present research makes at least three contributions to the literature.  First, although 
previous studies suggest an association between prevention focus and a preference for the status 
quo (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman et al., 1999), they make the assumption that the option 
representing the status quo is good, satisfactory, and problem-free, which offers a safe choice 
that fits with the prevention concerns to avoid negative outcomes.  As a result, the status quo 
preference is aligned with other concerns (e.g., hedonic, utilitarian, ethical concerns), making it 
difficult to pinpoint the primary motivation behind repetition.  The current research pits the 
prevention preference for the status quo against other concerns, presenting a more inclusive 
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picture of the status quo that does not necessarily reflect what is pleasant, effective, or ethical.  
For this reason, the current research not only extends previous findings by clarifying the 
underlying mechanism, but it also alerts us to the downsides of maintaining the status quo. 
Second, the studies on copying revealed the usefulness of a regulatory focus perspective 
in understanding the prevalence and perpetuation of unpleasant and ineffective behaviors in the 
workplace against people’s better judgment (Bennett & Robinson, 2003; Kidwell & Martin, 
2004).  It has been shown that our judgment about what is right and wrong is highly susceptible 
to external influence, which highlights the importance of leadership, peer behavior, norms, and 
culture in shaping the behavior of individuals (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).  The 
findings presented in the five studies on copying suggest that individuals in a prevention focus 
are particularly susceptible to the external influence of one’s social environment, who are more 
concerned about following normative behaviors established by a role mode than acting upon 
their hedonic or utilitarian considerations.  
Third, the studies on persisting in one’s own unethical behavior answer the call for 
processual models of ethical violations (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008).  Although 
a few process models have been proposed to account for the incremental development of 
unethical behaviors, such as routinization (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), moral seduction 
(Moore et al., 2006), and gradual erosion (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Minor, 1984), there is a lack 
of empirical work to directly test these models and relevant findings are far from conclusive.  
Instead of viewing unethical acts as isolated and static states, the current studies provide 
evidence for the process model by revealing an incremental degradation from an innocuous lapse 
to a more significant violation.  A process view is useful to capture the complexities and 
dynamics of unethical practices (Ashforth et al., 2008).  For instance, treating ethical behaviors 
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as unrelated static states in the current studies would have rendered prevention focus an 
irrelevant factor because of its null effect on a single ethical behavior; only when a process view 
is adopted does prevention focus show a robust effect on perpetuation of unethical behaviors. 
Practical Implications 
An important implication of this research for management practice is that the regulatory 
focus perspective sheds new light on the understanding and prevention of negative organizational 
behaviors.  First, having a prevention focus predicts repeated unethical behaviors not only when 
strong prevention is a chronic disposition (Studies 1 & 3-7), but also when it is a characteristic of 
the social environments that activate prevention concerns (Studies 2, 8, 9).  Indeed, regulatory 
focus orientations define the collective culture of many organizations (Brockner & Higgins, 
2001; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007).  For example, a prevention-focused culture exists in accounting 
(Moore et al., 2006), financial service (Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004; Zou, 2009), and public utility 
firms (Brockner & Higgins, 2001), and the list could be extended to include more organizations 
that stress prevention-focused goals (e.g., safety, security), such as pharmaceutical companies, 
health care/insurance providers, hospitals, and the military.  Such cultures institutionalize a 
prevention orientation that may predispose employees to repeat unethical practices if they begin 
to happen.  More generally, the fact that regulatory focus can be situationally induced as a 
motivational state is especially important given that there are many real-world, long-lasting 
inductions of prevention focus, such as the concerns with terrorism following the September 11 
attack and job insecurity during recent economic recessions.  Such inductions could trigger 
severe problems if organizations were exposed to questionable practices that set the precedent 
for a problematic status quo. 
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Another implication of the present findings concerns the potential downside of negative 
reward systems that penalize transgressor individuals or organizations through official 
punishment (e.g., court fines, firings/delistings) or unofficial punishment (e.g., public shaming, 
retaliation; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Although anticipating punishment can function as a deterrent, it 
does not address the problem of corrupt individuals and organizations that have a history of 
transgression (Moore et al., 2006). Even worse, because punishment induces a strong prevention 
focus (Higgins, 1996), it may backfire by encouraging repeated transgressions once they have 
begun, especially when the initial transgression is inadvertent or innocuous enough to pass 
ethical judgment. Given that for individuals with a strong prevention focus maintaining the status 
quo is a deeper motivation than hedonic concerns per se (Higgins, 2005, 2012), punishment 
could increase the motivation to repeat a transgression rather than inducing the intended hedonic 
concern about punishment. Paradoxically then, punishment could end up driving former 
transgressors further down the slippery slope. 
One way to alleviate this potential downside of punishment is to ensure that individuals 
and organizations start with a desirable practice, which not only removes the origin of a slippery 
slope but also establishes an ethical status quo. As the current findings suggest, the benefits of an 
initial ethical behavior are not restricted to the appropriateness of the behavior itself; it may also 
launch a self-sustaining cycle of ethical commitment, especially in organizations with a 
prevention culture. For this reason, organizations should employ a preventive approach that 
precludes possible misconducts and rewards positive behaviors, rather than a corrective approach 
that relies solely on reactive punishments. In situations where an initial misconduct already 
occurred, managers should be aware of its reverberations on subsequent behaviors of the 
transgressor. Instead of resorting to punishments as the only solution to stop its reoccurrence, 
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intervention programs could be introduced to “reset” the status quo by supporting the 
transgressor in taking new and ethical actions, through which the transgressor can safely reverse 
the previous misconduct and reestablish a new status quo of ethical actions. Moreover, to 
motivate repeating the new ethical behaviors, managers can create or reinforce prevention 
concerns by setting aside positive incentives, such as extra salary and vacation days, that are 
maintained (non-loss) as long as employees persist the new ethical behaviors (Brodscholl, 
Kober, & Higgins, 2007). 
Limitations and Future Research 
The use of experimental design allows the current research to determine the causality of 
hypothesized relationships and rule out alternative explanations.  However, experimental design 
can have limitations regarding its external validity.  Although this issue was addressed in Study 5 
that showed generalizability of the prevention-copying relation from laboratory to organizational 
settings, the second set of studies on persisting in own unethical behavior were all conducted 
experimentally.  Therefore, future research should examine whether their findings extend to the 
representative real-world settings, where individuals or organizations make questionable calls 
that turn out to affect later decisions.  Another limitation of the present research is that only two 
domains of unethical behavior were examined—performance overstatement and failure to 
disclose.  Although both behaviors are common examples of ethically questionable practices 
(e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; Robinson et al., 2000; Shell, 1991), they are not the only ways in 
which individuals and organizations may breach ethical principles.  Future research needs to 
investigate a broader range of unethical behaviors, not only generalized forms of dishonesty such 
as lying, cheating, or stealing (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006), but also more context-
specific behaviors such as workplace deviance (e.g., absenteeism, embezzlement, sabotage; 
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Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  Another meaningful extension of this research is to test the role of 
prevention focus in sustaining ethical behaviors that meet or exceed moral standards to benefit 
organizations or societies at large, such as organizational citizenship behaviors, whistle-blowing, 
and corporate volunteerism.  Moreover, in resolving the seeming discrepancy in the findings 
between the experimental studies (Studies 1-4) and the field study (Study 5), which was that 
prevention focus predicted copying both harsh and lenient methods in the experiments whereas it 
predicted copying only “bad” management methods in the field study, I provided the speculation 
that prevention focus did not predict copying “good” management methods in the field study 
because these behaviors represent a default way to manage and therefore all managers, 
irrespective of their regulatory focus, are encouraged to and thus more likely to engage in these 
behaviors.  Future research should test this speculation by factoring the variable of whether a 
behavior is viewed as the default way to manage subordinates. 
As an orientation against negative deviations from the status quo, prevention focus is 
associated with the motivation to both copy the interpersonal behaviors of others and persist in 
the personal decisions of oneself.  A question thus arises: how would prevention-focused 
individuals react if the two motivations are pitted against each other?  For example, when people 
make a judgment about an issue and later find out that their own judgment contrasts with their 
group’s judgment on the same issue, will their self-regulatory orientation predict an adjustment 
towards the group’s judgment or a persistence in their personal judgment?  Although the present 
research is limited in directly addressing this question as it studied the two motivations 
separately, it does suggest that prevention-focused individuals may base their choice on which 
motivation provides better justification.  As one of the pilot studies on copying shows, when a 
normal grading method was made available (in addition to the harsh and lenient methods), it 
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attracted most votes from participants including those in a prevention focus, probably because 
the choice of the normal method was the easiest to justify.  It is only when people are faced with 
only the two uncommon methods (i.e., harsh and lenient methods) that were equally difficult to 
justify, being in a prevention focus would direct them to go along with a role model so they 
could use descriptive norms as the basis for their choice.  Future research should take into 
account the justifiability of self- versus other-made choices as a possible moderator in predicting 
people’s choice between copying others and repeating themselves. 
 Last but not least, future research should try to identify the boundary conditions of the 
relation between a strong prevention focus and repeating a past misconduct. In the present 
research, the innocuous origin of a slippery slope is relatively easy to rationalize and accept as 
the benchmark for future behaviors. Such a pattern may be less likely if the initial lapse poses a 
notable threat to people’s moral self-evaluations, as it will be too difficult to rationalize. Thus, 
instead of yielding additional misconducts, a conspicuous lapse may lead individuals to feel 
morally debased and consequently motivate ethical actions to “cleanse” themselves (Sachdeva, 
Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), especially if they are strong prevention 
individuals who don’t want to make a clear mistake or sin of commission (Camacho, Higgins, & 
Luger, 2003). Future research should examine this possibility by assessing the effect of the 
extremity of the initial lapse on prevention-focused individuals’ likelihood of repeating the lapse. 
Another boundary condition worth exploring is the similarity between the initial and subsequent 
choices. In the present studies, the two choices were very similar. It is possible that they could be 
quite different (i.e., a “spillover” effect), such as an initial transgression of inflating sales spilling 
over to a different transgression like backdating or falsifying accounts. How different the initial 
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and subsequent choices can be while still showing the prevention effect on repetition is an 
important question, theoretically and practically. 
Conclusion 
This research is the first to examine how differences in regulatory focus influence the 
tendency to copy an interpersonal behavior from others and to persist in one’s own unethical 
behavior.  The key finding was that being in a prevention focus predicts the tendency to repeat a 
prior behavior that is either perceived as normative or committed as a personal choice—
independent of hedonic, utilitarian, and ethical concerns about the behavior itself.  Taken 
together, the current research reveals an important role of prevention focus in perpetuating 
interpersonal behaviors across similar relationships and independent ethical choices over time.  
Given that the motivation to perpetuate a behavior may result in bliss or woe for individuals and 
organizations, I hope that extending this work in future studies will uncover ways to harvest the 





1In Study 2, 3, and 4, the reliabilities of the two scales were all above .80. 
2Because logistic regression is a non-linear model (so is it in Study 2, 3, 4, 6, 7), simple 
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3In an independent study with different participants recruited from the same university 
campus (N = 46), the same design and procedures were used as Study 3 but only the two non-
normative conditions were examined.  This study yielded the same results as the two non-
normative conditions of Study 3, such that prevention focus did not predict copying when a role 
model’s managing behavior was non-normative, β = -1.38, z = -1.67, ns, thus supporting the 
hypothesis about the normative determination of copying for prevention-focused individuals. 
4In the independent study including the two same non-normative conditions as Study 3 
(see footnote 3), the results also showed an interaction effect between the received method and 
satisfaction with this method, β = 2.53, z = 2.06, p < .05, replicating the findings of Study 3 that 
satisfaction with a non-normative managing behavior, instead of the strength of prevention focus, 
predicts the tendency to copy this behavior. 
5There was no gender effect on Studies 7-9 either. 
6Given that the results revealed a trend of promotion focus predicting “anti-copying”, 
which reached marginal significance in Study 1 (p = .09) and in the normative condition of Study 
3 (p = .08), I performed meta-analyses of the promotion effects in studies that measured 
regulatory focus as a chronic trait (Study 1, the normative condition of Study 3, and Study 4).  
The meta-analyses revealed no main effect of promotion focus, χ2(6) = 4.06, p = .67, but a 
significant interactive effect between promotion focus and the received method emerged, χ2(6) = 
14.04, p = .03. Further analyses showed that the interactive effect was driven by individuals with 
a weak promotion focus, χ2(6) = 15.25, p = .02, who demonstrated the tendency to copy, but not 
by individuals with a strong promotion focus, whose later choice of grading method was not 
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FIGURE 1. Probability of Method Chosen as a Function of Prevention Focus in Harsh and 






Figure 2. Proportion of Method Chosen as a Function of Received Method and Induced 































FIGURE 3. Probability of Method Chosen as a Function of Prevention Focus, Received Method, 





FIGURE 4. Probability of Method Chosen as a Function of Prevention Focus in Harsh and 





FIGURE 5a. Managers’ Use of Monitoring as a Function of Their Former Superiors’ Use of 





FIGURE 5b. Managers’ Use of Coercive Power as a Function of Their Former Superiors’ Use of 





FIGURE 5c. Managers’ Use of Negative Feedback as a Function of Their Former Superiors’ Use 






FIGURE 5d. Managers’ Use of Monitoring as a Function of Their Former Superiors’ Use of 


































FIGURE 6b. Likelihood of Reporting the Correct Answer to an Anagram as a Function of 





FIGURE 7a. Percentage of Participants with Self-Report Performance and Inflation of 0 to 15 





























FIGURE 7b. Likelihood of Subsequent Cheating (Self-Report Inflation) as a Function of Chronic 
































FIGURE 8a. Percentage of Participants with Self-Report Performance and Inflation of 0 to 15 





























FIGURE 8b. Percentage of Subsequent Cheating (Self-Report Inflation) as a Function of Induced 








































FIGURE 9a. Percentage of Participants Failing to Disclose Intentions in the Second Negotiation 
as a Function of Induced Prevention Focus and Failure to Disclose in the First Negotiation 













































Car negotiation: disclosure (behavioral measure) 




FIGURE 9b. Percentage of Participants Failing to Disclose Intentions in the Second Negotiation 
as a Function of Induced Prevention Focus and Failure to Disclose in the First Negotiation (Self-












































Car negotiation: disclosure (self-report measure) 




TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Correlationsa (Study 5) 
 Variable Mean   SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Prevention focus 3.67 0.75         
2. Promotion focus 3.80 0.50 .23        
3. Work facilitation 3.40 0.82 -.07 .14 (.75/.75)      
4. Directive leadership 3.37 0.88 .01 .18 .75** (.73/.76)     
5. Use of legitimate power 3.86 0.92 -.01 .09 .61* .53** (.92/.75)    
6. Monitoring 2.49 0.71 -.12 -.12 -.24 -.23 -.07 (.64/.70)   
7. Use of coercive power 1.74 0.82 -.11 -.17 -.14 -.29* .01 .27 (.84/.75)  
8. Use of negative feedback 2.16 0.65 -.07 -.15 -.30* -.40** -.20 .27 .33* (.63/.78) 
9. Satisfaction with former superior 3.78 1.06 .04 .13 .79** .69** .50** -.32* -.35* -.44** 
a  The first and second values in parentheses are alpha reliabilities for the superior and subordinate subsamples, respectively. 





A list of three negotiation tips (Study 9): 
 
STRATEGY 1: ANCHORING 
 
First offers have a vigorous anchoring impact in negotiations.  Negotiations research has 
repeated shown that final prices are positively correlated with first offers – the less a buyer 
offers, the lower the final price; the more a seller asks for, the higher the final price.  Negotiators 
are advised to make aggressive first offers, i.e. low for buyers and high for sellers. 
 
 
STRATEGY 2: FOCUSING ON “WHY” 
 
When two people take opposing sides during a negotiation, they both often refuse to budge from 
their divergent viewpoints.  The crucial question that neither party has asked the other, is to 
explain the reason and motivation behind their position.  Negotiators are advised to ask 
questions about the intentions of the other party.  Find out why they want it.  
 
 
STRATEGY 3: KNOWING WHEN TO WALK AWAY 
 
Decide on your “walk-away” position before starting a negotiation, and never reevaluate your 
“walk-away” position while sitting at the table.  Clearly express your position and reasons and let 
the other party know that you mean what you say.  Negotiators are advised to walk away if the 
deal cannot be obtained without violating your prior walk-away decision. 
 
